

THE HILL VERSUS THE FIELD: A CASE-STUDY ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED
GANG VIOLENCE BETWEEN TWO BOSTON GANGS

by

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Presented to the

Sociology Department

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Harvard College

Cambridge, Massachusetts

March 11, 2010

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the Harvard University Sociology Department for their generous funding to help me conduct my research. I would also like to acknowledge the Phillips Brooks House Association for the amazing efforts of their staff in helping connect me with interview subjects and transportation. I greatly appreciate the cooperation of the Boston Police Department and David Hureau for sharing their data about shootings between these two neighborhoods with me. This project would not have been possible without their generosity and collaboration.

I would like to acknowledge the 20 individuals who participated in my interviews. Despite being a challenging topic to discuss, these people were willing to talk about their experiences to help improve the research about gang violence in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and I am grateful for their cooperation.

I also give my sincerest gratitude to all of the individuals who helped listen to my ideas, read my drafts, and keep me motivated throughout this long project. Although there are too many to mention on this page, I would like to thank my family, friends, and roommates for all of their help.

Lastly and most importantly, I would like to acknowledge the tireless efforts of my Thesis Advisor, Bruce Western, and First Reader, Anthony Braga. I would not have been able to complete this project without their constant encouragement and advice.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Homicide rates in the United States have followed a roller coaster ride since the 1980s. Despite decreasing to 18,692 homicides in 1984, the homicide rate skyrocketed to 24,703 in 1991 (US Department of Justice 2010). Although the homicide rate subsided in the late 1990s, reaching a low of 15,522 homicides in 1999, homicides have again begun to increase, reaching 17,034 in 2006 (US Department of Justice 2010). Youth homicides¹ have followed a similar progression, peaking in 1993 with 9,204 youth victims. Although youth homicide rates decreased in the late 1990s, reaching a low of 5,531 homicides in 2000, they also have been increasing since the early 2000s with 6,230 youth victims in 2006 (US Department of Justice 2010). Research suggests a significant portion of youth homicides are gang-related,² with Braga, Hureau, and Winship (2008) citing that one third of youth homicides in Chicago, 50% of youth homicides in Los Angeles' Boyle Heights area, and 60% of youth homicides in Boston are gang-related. In the context of steadily rising homicide rates, this strong correlation demands an understanding of sustained gang violence over time. My thesis will answer this question on a case-study level, using a violent gang rivalry in Boston.

Current research offers several macro-level theories to explain the continuity of gang violence. The most widely cited theory for the origins of gang violence in the United States is the emergence of the crack cocaine era in the 1980s (Blumstein 1995; Moore and Tonry 1998; Cook and Laub 1998). Blumstein (1995) argues guns became

¹ "Youth homicides" refer to victims ages 24 and under.

² In this thesis, "gang-related" crimes are defined as crimes "motivated by gang behavior, such as drug dealing, turf protection, or a continuing 'beef' with a rival gang or gangs." (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 1996:30). Although other law enforcement agencies (e.g. Los Angeles) use a more liberal definition of a crime committed by or against a known gang member, Boston focuses on the motive of the crime (Kennedy et al. 1996). My thesis will use the motiv-based definition to provide consistency with the literature about other Boston gangs.

more available and more widely used during the 1980s as a way for gang associates to regulate the illicit drug business. Cook and Laub (1998) elaborated on Blumstein's theory, suggesting youth attitudes toward guns shifted during the 1980s. Increasing numbers of youth armed themselves with guns, causing other youth in urban America to arm themselves for protection. This shift in ideals caused disputes that previously were settled with fists and knives to be settled with guns.

Another broad theory for the persistence of gang violence argues cultural factors drive sustained violent gang rivalries. Research by Anderson (1998), Fagan and Wilkinson (1998), and Gilligan (1996) further suggests gang violence continues because youth desire "street credit" and respect that can often only be acquired and maintained by resorting to violence. If a youth is publicly disrespected or humiliated, these researchers argue he will be forced to use violence against his peers to regain his status in the community. These cultural explanations suggest youth gang violence in America has continued because of the widespread availability of firearms and feelings of disrespect over interpersonal disputes.

The final most widely cited theory of sustained youth gang violence is retaliation. Directly linked with the aforementioned cultural explanations, numerous researchers (e.g. Klein and Maxson 1987; Jacobs and Wright 2006; Decker 1996; Short 1985) suggest gang violence continues because of a group need for retaliation. If an individual from one gang is physically assaulted or shot, the gang seeks retaliation to reassert their social status by retaliating against the original gang, usually with equal or escalated forms of violence (Klein and Maxson 1987). Jacobs and Wright (2006) argue all street criminals desire immediate retaliation, but various situational factors, such as increased police

presence or a lack of information about the offender, often prolong the retaliation. As such, retaliation can be reflexive (i.e. immediate) or deferred (i.e. a substantial length of time after the initial incident). According to the aforementioned researchers, one retaliatory strike can evolve into an ongoing cycle of escalating violence, sustaining gang rivalries over long periods of time.

Research concerning gang violence in Boston suggests these macro-level theories hold true across the city. Braga (2003) argues the crack cocaine era sparked gang violence in Boston in the late 1980s, with the majority of this violence concentrated spatially to approximately 5% of Boston streets. As stated earlier, approximately 60% of youth homicides in Boston are gang-related, which is considerably higher than in other cities despite Boston having significantly fewer gangs and gang members (Braga et al. 2008; Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996). Although some assert Boston's gang problem is unique, and therefore that Boston-centric theories are less applicable to situations in other cities, it is still an important area to study because the majority of youth homicides in Boston are gang-affiliated. By studying what has sustained gang violence in Boston over the last 30 years, we can more effectively intervene to decrease and stop the lethal violence. Unfortunately, there is a significant lack of qualitative studies on Boston gangs in comparison with other cities; however, my thesis will help to fill that void.

My research examines the validity of the national and Boston-specific theories about sustained gang violence at the micro-level using a case study analysis of the gang violence between the Franklin Hill Giants (FHG) and Franklin Field Boyz (FFB). Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are two public housing developments in Boston with a longstanding violent gang rivalry. My research focuses on these two rival gangs because

they have been characterized as two of the most violent gangs in Boston during the past 30 years (Kennedy et al. 1996). In addition, I have worked in these communities for several years, giving me access to resources to help answer my main research question, as well as a personal interest in the people the violence directly affects. Little research exists about the gangs in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, as only one other researcher (Harding 2005; 2009) has studied these gangs. While Harding's research focuses on the age-structure networks of the gangs in these neighborhoods, my research will make a new contribution by focusing on the origins and maintenance of this violent gang rivalry.

In order to understand the continuity of violence between these rival gangs, I constructed three smaller, more specific research questions based on the existing literature. First, I explored what had initially caused the gangs to emerge and become violent rivals. Second, I studied what has sustained the gang violence over time to determine whether or not these factors were consistent with the origins of the gang rivalry. Lastly, I examined the incidence and type of retaliation within this gang rivalry.

My research consisted of 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and former gang members and longtime community members who have witnessed and been a part of this violent gang rivalry since it began in the 1980s. My interviews focused on answering my three aforementioned research questions, while my quantitative data concerning the length of time between and location of shootings between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field associates specifically served to supplement my analysis of retaliation.

The results of my analyses suggest national and Boston-specific theories are true at the micro-level in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. The results from my interviews

confirm the gang rivalry between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field emerged from drug territory disputes during the beginning of the crack cocaine era in the 1980s. The location of these two neighborhoods along Blue Hill Avenue made them prime competitors in the illicit drug trade. Initially, associates from each neighborhood became violent against individuals from the opposing neighborhood in an effort to eliminate drug market competition, and over time the rivalry has become ingrained in the culture of these neighborhoods.

According to my qualitative results, gang violence continued after the crack cocaine era ended because of cultural factors. The end of the crack cocaine era coincided with the disappearance of many of the oldest, most experienced members of the gangs, either to prison or death. The disappearance of these older mentors led to the disappearance of the old “code of the streets” in which an individual only retaliated against the specific person who wronged him, and retaliation for nonviolent disrespect most often resulted in a weaponless fight. During the early 1990s, associates of Franklin Hill and Franklin Field adopted a new “code of the streets,” similar to Anderson’s (1998) aforementioned theory, in which nonviolent disrespect was retaliated with immediate violence. Youth at this time only knew how to fight with guns, causing gun violence to become the norm. Youth from these rival gangs began using lethal violence to settle small, interpersonal disputes that used to be settled with fist-fights. The laws of retaliation mandate shooting violence be retaliated against with another shooting, causing a significant increase in the number of shootings between these rival gangs.

The results of my quantitative analyses of retaliation suggest long-term deferred retaliation is occurring between these rival gangs. Shootings by one rival gang are

significantly associated with shootings by the other gang two to three months after the initial shooting. The implication of this deferred retaliation is that it contributes to the continuity of gang violence because it maintains the violence at a slow, steady rate. The persistence of the retaliatory gang violence has allowed the rivalry to become so ingrained in the culture of the neighborhood that today's youth are willing to participate, often with no knowledge of the original cause of the rivalry. The culmination of all of these factors created and sustained the violent gang rivalry between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

The remainder of my thesis is divided into chapters to elaborate on the earlier described theories, methods, and results. First, I will review the existing literature and theories relevant to this topic. Next, I will describe the qualitative and quantitative methodology I used to gather and analyze data to answer my research questions. I will then describe the results of my qualitative interviews about the original and continued causes of this gang violence, followed by the results of my quantitative analyses on retaliation. My thesis will conclude with the discussion and conclusion section, highlighting the main results from my thesis, the implications of my research, and suggestions for future research in this field.

Chapter 2: Theories of Gang Violence


Youth Gang Violence in America

According to the 2007 National Youth Gang Survey, 788,000 gang members and 27,000 gangs are currently active in the United States (Egley 2009). Although the majority of gang related crimes are non-violent (Renzetti and Edleson 2008), the amount of gang-related homicides in the United States has significantly increased since the early 1980s (Cook and Laub 1998). Nationally, youth homicides peaked in 1993 with 9,204 youth victims and 7,010 homicides committed by youth (Puzzanchera and Kang 2008). Although national rates of youth homicide and gang-related violence decreased during the late 1990s, they again have begun to increase since the early 2000s (Fox and Zawitz 2010). These national trends are depicted in Figure 2.1.

Several theories attempt to explain the increase and continuity of youth violence during the past three decades. One of the most complex theories cited by numerous authors (e.g. Moore and Tonry 1998; Blumstein 1995) suggests several structural factors, such as lack of employment opportunities, economic problems, and the disappearance of cohesive family units, caused gangs to surface as a substitute for security. Crack cocaine was then introduced to urban America in the mid-1980s, resulting in an increase in guns and gun violence in order to regulate and protect this illegal business. Blumstein (1995) argued juveniles were recruited to work for drug dealers because they were willing and able, and would receive less severe punishments than older gang associates if apprehended for selling drugs. Blumstein continued to argue guns became more widely dispersed across urban communities because a majority of youth had them for drug business purposes and other neighboring youth needed to protect themselves from the

already armed youth. This widespread availability of guns led to an increase in gun-related violence among youth in America.

Figure 2.1: United States Homicides, 1980-2006



Source: Data adapted from US Department of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, March 2010

Cook and Laub (1998) supported this theory, explaining the introduction of crack cocaine and drug-related conflicts is only a piece of the explanation for the increase in youth violence. They argued although crack cocaine markets caused the initial upsurge in gun-related youth violence, the violence continued because gun availability increased and youth attitudes about guns changed dramatically. As more youth became armed with guns, other youth acquired guns in order to protect themselves. Disputes that previously were settled with fists and knives now were settled with lethal guns.

Although gun homicides escalated during the crack cocaine era in the 1980s, there is a significant body of literature that suggests there is no causal relationship between

involvement in illegal drug trafficking and violence (Decker 2007; Levine and Rosich 1996). Although there is a significant amount of overlap between drug markets and gang violence, Decker (2007) argues youth involved in gangs are no more likely to be involved in violence than youth in gangs who do not participate in drug activities. Despite common media depictions, this research suggests participation in drug trafficking actually is not a cause of sustained gang violence.

Fagan and Wilkinson (1998) also argue the increase in gun homicides might not be related solely to drug business but instead to other situational factors. For example, they argue guns became the symbol for youth to be perceived as powerful and masculine, shifting the norm in these communities to focus on guns instead of fists or knives to resolve issues. Fagan and Wilkinson (1998) argued the widespread presence and use of guns led to a shift in the “rules of fighting” among gang-involved youth (111). Anderson (1998) provides the most complete theory of these fighting rules with his analysis of youth gangs in Philadelphia. He describes the “code of the streets,” a set of rules meant to be followed by individuals who live in urban settings, regardless of whether they are “street” (i.e. involved in gang violence) or “decent” (i.e. not involved in gang violence) people. Anderson believes violence in urban America stems from youth being insecure and trying to establish themselves in their community. If an individual is “disrespected,” which can include something as serious as being physically assaulted or as simple as maintaining eye contact for too long, the individual must retaliate, usually with violence, to regain his/her self esteem.

Gilligan’s (1996) theory supports Anderson’s code of the streets, arguing shame and a lack of self esteem are the root cause of all violence. Based on years of extensive

interviews with people who were incarcerated for violent crimes, Gilligan argues individuals who are disrespected by others feel great shame, and can only displace their feelings of shame with violence, reasserting themselves as respectable individuals. As one of Gilligan's (1996) subjects explained, "If you don't have your self respect, you don't have nothing" (107) and "you wouldn't believe how much respect you get when you have a gun pointed at some dude's face" (109). These cultural explanations provide another interesting perspective to help understand the continuity of serious violence between rival gangs. My thesis will examine these cultural explanations at the micro-level to determine what role, if any, they have had in starting and continuing the violent gang rivalry between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

One of the most frequently cited causes of sustained gang violence is revenge. Klein and Maxson (1987) described the "violence escalation hypothesis" as the main cause of gang-related violence. They claim violence between gangs is a series of retaliatory actions, each escalating from the preceding violent act. This continual cycle of violence implies gang violence will never end since there will always be a need to escalate and retaliate for crimes committed against a group. This reciprocal group violence theory has been discussed by several other academics, including Short (1985; 1989) and Decker (1996). Short (1985; 1989) argues it is the group that is most important, not the individual, implying members of a gang will commit violent acts against another gang in order to defend and improve the status of the group. Decker (1996) studied gangs in St. Louis, and found similar collective actions. His analyses of gang violence showed significant spikes in violence, implying the upsurges in violence were related to and caused by preceding violent actions.

Jacobs and Wright (2006) argue retaliation exists in several forms based on the length of time to commit the retaliation and the nature of the retaliation (i.e. with or without face-to-face contact). They argue the two main types of retaliation are “reflexive” or immediate retaliation, and “deferred” or postponed retaliation. They explained although the majority of all street criminals want retaliation to be immediate, there are often situational factors, such as misinformation about the offender’s identity or location, injury to oneself during the initial attack, or increased police presence, that make this immediate retaliation impossible. My research will examine which, if any, of these theories of retaliation appear to be the main type of retaliation between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and the important implications of these results for gang violence intervention.

Similar to the group theories of retaliatory violence, Roger Gould (2003) argues for the importance of vendettas in violent group contexts. Vendettas, violent retaliations for the death of a family member, are intended to punish and frighten the enemies of the victim; reestablish the collective reputation and cohesion of the victimized group; and dispel any doubts of neutral third parties about the honor and unity of the victimized group (Gould 2003). Gould believes the threat of revenge should deter aggression and violence between rival groups, which could explain why there are times when cycles of retaliatory violence are interrupted with peace. This theory of group violence is valid only if all members of the group have strong ties to and identify with the group. My thesis will examine this group theory on the micro level between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field to determine if vendettas and collective group violence play a role in sustaining youth gang violence.

Structural theories also attempt to explain what causes gang violence.

Neighborhoods with high mobility rates, low socioeconomic status, minority races, and other similar structural factors have a higher prevalence of gangs and gang violence than neighborhoods without those factors (Decker 2007). However, most gangs in Boston, particularly the gang rivalry between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, are located in extremely close proximity to one another. These spatially concentrated gang rivalries suggest that although structural factors play a significant role as general risk factors for gangs and urban crime to surface, they are not the only motivating factors. If they were, there would be gang violence in all neighborhoods of Boston with similar demographic and structural characteristics, but this type of gang violence is limited almost exclusively to Dorchester, Mattapan, and Roxbury, despite similar neighborhoods and public housing projects existing in other parts of the city (Kennedy et al. 1996). This trend is also national, with more than half of the law enforcement jurisdictions who reported gang problems between 2002 and 2007 to the National Youth Gang Survey claiming they had no gang-related homicides (Egley and O'Donnell 2009). My thesis is not examining these structural factors as possible maintenance factors of the gang violence because it is a widely accepted fact that these factors contribute to urban crime, including gang violence. Although these factors are nearly identical between the two neighborhoods, they are outside the scope of my data analysis. I am instead examining what micro-level factors, in addition to the macro-level ones described earlier, sustain gang violence using Franklin Hill and Franklin Field as a case study.


Youth Gang Violence in Boston

Similar to national statistics, gang violence in Boston became much more problematic in the late 1980s. Labeled an “epidemic” of youth violence, Boston youth homicides rose from an average of 28 per year between 1980 and 1988 to a peak of 73 in 1990. Although youth homicide rates decreased during the 1990s, they remained higher than in the preceding decades with an average of 45 youth homicides each year between 1991 and 1995 (Braga, Hureau, and Winship 2008). The youth homicide trends in Boston from 1976 to 2009 are depicted below in Figure 2.2. Although all youth homicides in Boston are not gang-related, research suggests at least 60% of youth homicides, if not more, are related to gang violence (Braga 2003). Therefore, analyzing youth homicide trends provides a fairly accurate picture of levels of gang violence in Boston over time.

According to Braga (2003), the epidemic of youth violence in Boston was consistent with national trends. Research suggests the national theories of crack cocaine causing the epidemic of youth violence were true locally in Boston. Crack cocaine markets first appeared in Boston in 1986 and were followed several years later by significant increases in shooting homicides (Braga 2003).

Following the epidemic of youth violence, Boston implemented several problem-oriented strategies to reduce youth violence, including Operation Ceasefire, a “pulling levers” policing strategy targeted at reducing gang violence (Braga 2003). These programs, which focused on bringing together law enforcement personnel, youth workers, clergy, and academic researchers, were credited with helping to create the “Boston Miracle,” a period of time in the late 1990s with the lowest number of shootings and youth homicides in Boston’s recent history (Braga et al. 2008). In 1999, only five youth homicides were attributed to gang violence. Following the conclusion of Operation

Figure 2.2: Homicides in Boston, 1976-2009




Source: Data adapted from Braga and Hureau 2010

Ceasefire in 2000, the Boston Miracle ended, jumping from 15 youth homicides in 2000 to 26 in 2001. Between 1999 and 2007, Boston youth homicides nearly tripled from 15 to 41, while gang-related youth homicides increased almost eight-fold, from five to 38. The recent upsurge in gang-related homicides is depicted in Figure 2.3.

In 2006, there were approximately 1,422 gang members in the city of Boston affiliated with 65 gangs (Braga et al. 2008). Despite being a significant minority of Boston’s population (approximately 1.3% of youth in Boston), almost 77% of the youth homicides in 2006 were gang-related, with 70% of all 2006 shootings in Boston involving a gang associate as the perpetrator or victim (Braga et al. 2008). These dramatic increases in youth gang violence in Boston suggest more research is needed to better understand what has sustained the violence in this city in order to intervene and prevent future gang violence.

Figure 2.3: Homicides in Boston, 1999-2009



Source: Data adapted from Braga and Hureau 2010.

As mentioned earlier, Blumstein (1995) argued youth violence in America increased due to the widespread dispersal of firearms during the crack cocaine era. However, research suggests this theory is not true for Boston's youth violence. Instead of youth across the city possessing and using guns as Blumstein's theory would suggest, Braga, Papchristos, and Hureau (2009) discovered only 5% of street intersections in Boston generated 74% of all shootings in the city between 1980 and 2009. These trends were also stable across time, implying gun violence was not spreading throughout the city, but remaining in localized neighborhoods and streets. These findings show shootings in Boston are clustered among a small number of people in a small number of places, suggesting research on the micro-level is necessary to determine what has sustained the continued violence in these areas. My thesis will provide one example of

this micro-level analysis to help us better understand what has continued youth gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

Youth Gang Violence in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field

Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are two of Boston's public housing developments. Located in Dorchester off Blue Hill Avenue, the "projects" have been a significant presence in the local community since the 1950s. Franklin Hill was built in 1952, with Franklin Field being completed two years later in 1954. Franklin Hill includes 364 units, ranging in size from one to five-bedroom apartments. Franklin Field is slightly larger with 386 units, containing an elderly section of 46 one-bedroom units, as well as family units with one to five-bedrooms. The rent for each apartment is calculated as 30% of the resident's income (Boston Housing Authority 2010a; Boston Housing Authority 2010b). These two housing developments have over 1,000 residents living in them (Chambers 2008). Until recent years, Franklin Field has received many more resources, including both state and federal funding (Boston Housing Authority 2010a), as well as the establishment and reopening of a local Teen Center that had been closed for several years due to vandalism (Chambers 2008). However, Franklin Hill recently underwent a massive renovation, including \$98 million worth of demolition and redevelopment of over 300 units. The demolition began in January of 2007 (Office of the Mayor, Thomas M. Menino 2007), and residents have now begun moving back into their homes.

According to the 2000 Census, approximately 80% of residents in the same census tract as Franklin Hill and Franklin Field define themselves as African American, 25% as Latino, and 8% as Caucasian³ (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b). The median household income level in 2000 for residents of these communities was

³ Residents could select more than one race.

\$22,846, with nearly 38% of residents living below the poverty level (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b).

Beginning in the 1980s, a notorious gang rivalry exists between youth in the two public housing developments (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b). The 1980s were a time of large amounts of drug trafficking in Boston and throughout the country, particularly crack cocaine (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b). Several sources claim this is what prompted the gang rivalry between the two projects (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b; Chambers 2008). Others claim the two sides are simply “at odds” with one another and have been since the 1980s for no apparent reason (Heart of the City 2010a; Heart of the City 2010b). One of the goals of my thesis is to determine the collective memory about what first prompted these gangs to surface and begin committing violence against one another.

As mentioned earlier, the two gangs based in these developments are known as the Franklin Field Boyz (FFB) and Franklin Hill Giants (FHG). Associates of the FFB often wear Florida Marlins baseball gear to show their affiliation, while members of the FHG sport New York Giants football attire (Chambers 2008). Vincent Chambers, a Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who has worked extensively on the crimes committed between the two gangs, has called the rivalry “one of the most persistent and historically violent gang disputes in [Boston]” (2008). Kennedy et al. (1996) also listed the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field rivalry as one of the most violent rivalries in Boston during the early 1990s. According to an affidavit by Special Agent Chambers (2008), the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) of the Boston Police Department linked disputes between the FFB and the FHG to 15 shootings, four of which

were homicides, during 2007 and 2008. Special Agent Chambers explained these shootings were more than any other gang conflict in Boston during the same time period (2008). The significant amount of violent crime exclusively between the FHG and FFB makes these two gangs an important case study for examining how gang violence is sustained over time.

Although there has been a great deal of research nationally and in Boston about the causes and maintenance of youth gang violence, there are few micro-level case-studies about gang violence in Boston. Barkan and Snowden (2001) argued the only way to understand theories of collective violence is to test them on the micro-level, which is one of the goals of my thesis. Qualitative research about gangs in Boston also is extremely sparse. Numerous studies exist on Chicago and Los Angeles gangs, and although Boston gangs are not as violent, they still cause great disturbances and threats to other people in the city. David Harding (2005; 2009) is the only person who has qualitatively studied the gangs in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, but his research focused on age structures and peer networks in violent, disadvantaged neighborhoods.

My thesis is testing the aforementioned theories of youth gang violence on a micro-level to determine if the continuity of the gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field is consistent with these preexisting models. Specifically, I will be examining the origins of the specific gang rivalry to determine if it is consistent with the research of Blumstein (1995), Cook and Laub (1998), and Braga (2003) suggesting youth gang violence emerged in the 1980s due to the emergence of the crack cocaine markets. I will examine the continual nature of the youth gang violence to determine if it is consistent with the cultural explanations of Anderson (1998), Fagan and Wilkinson

(1998), and Gilligan (1996) focused on issues of status and respect motivating youth gang violence. Finally, I will determine which, if any, theories of retaliation (e.g. Gould 2003; Jacobs and Wright 2006) are carried out at the micro level in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field that could help us better understand the continuity of serious violence between youth gangs.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Research Questions and Brief Overview

As stated earlier in my thesis, my main research question is to determine what factors sustain gang violence over time. In order to determine this, I am using a case study analysis of two violent, rival gangs in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. My main research question can be subdivided into three sub-questions. The first is determining the origins of the specific gang rivalry to test if it is consistent with the research of Blumstein (1995), Cook and Laub (1998), and Braga (2003) suggesting youth gang violence emerged in the 1980s due to the emergence of the crack cocaine markets. I will answer this research question using in-depth interviews with law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and former gang members and longtime community members, all of whom have lived and worked in these two neighborhoods during the past 30 years. These interview methods will be described in greater detail below.

My second research question focuses on understanding the continual nature of the youth gang violence to determine if it is consistent with the cultural explanations of Anderson (1998), Fagan and Wilkinson (1998), and Gilligan (1996) focused on issues of status and respect motivating youth gang violence. I will answer this question using qualitative data from the in-depth interviews mentioned earlier.

Finally, I will determine which, if any, theories of retaliation (e.g. Gould 2003; Jacobs and Wright 2006) are carried out at the micro level in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field that could help us better understand the continuity of serious violence between youth gangs. Specifically, I will research to determine if retaliation is occurring in the form of shootings between associates of Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and, if it is, at what rate. I will use statistical analyses of quantitative datasets regarding shootings in

Franklin Hill and Franklin Field to determine whether retaliation shootings are reflexive, deferred, or do not exist.

Qualitative Data

In order to answer my first two research questions, I conducted 20 in-depth interviews with law enforcement officers, youth workers, and former gang associates and long-term community members who all have extensive experience working with or being the youth involved in the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field gang rivalry. My law enforcement personnel sample contained six people, including individuals from local law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction in the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field area (B-3 police jurisdiction). The experience of my sample of law enforcement personnel spans the past three decades, the full length of time this gang rivalry has existed. My youth worker sample contained six people, including employees at several Boston programs and directors from local non-profits that serve Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. Their experience also extends back into the early 1980s. My final sample of former gang associates and longtime community members included eight people, four of whom grew up in Franklin Hill and four who grew up in Franklin Field. All of these individuals were in their late teens or 20s during the 1980s. The level of involvement of these individuals with the gangs in the Franklin area varied, with some being highly influential ranking members of the gangs, while others were only tangentially involved. These former gang members are commonly known as “oldheads” or “OGs” (i.e. Original Gangsters) in the community, slang terms for older gang members. Per regulations from the Harvard University Internal Review Board (IRB) Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in

Research, all of these individuals were not involved in any gang activities for the five years prior to my interviews.

I chose these three sample groups because they provide the most complete information about the nature of the gang rivalry between these two housing developments that I would have access to with the IRB's restrictions.⁴ All of these individuals have had extensive interactions with youth currently and formerly involved in these gangs for the past 30 years. Although interviews with current youth associated with each gang would have been ideal, the IRB restricted me from speaking with these individuals out of concern for their privacy and my personal safety. The collective experiences and knowledge of the 20 individuals I interviewed encompasses the full 30 years these gangs have existed, providing me with a comprehensive history of the gangs' activities. I needed to interview individuals who could give me this long-term history because my research question involves identifying the factors that sustain gang violence over time. In order to completely answer this question, I need to examine accounts of violent incidents since the beginning of the rivalry because motivations for continuing the violence may have changed over time.

In order to find these individuals I began contacting people I know from my work in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field directing an after-school enrichment program. This

⁴ Despite several months of correspondence with the Harvard University IRB, I was not granted permission to interview any current gang associates, regardless of their age. They expressed concerns about the confidentiality of my interview subjects' responses, my personal safety, and my interviews causing increased gang violence between the two groups because I would be talking with individuals from both gangs. Although I offered to obtain a certificate of confidentiality to protect my subjects' responses from potential criminal prosecution, have worked with loosely gang-affiliated youth in this area for several years, and presented evidence of other researchers interviewing current gang affiliates and gang violence in Boston being extremely targeted with little or no random violence against unaffiliated individuals, the IRB still refused to approve my original proposal. I therefore focused on interviewing youth workers, law enforcement personnel, and former gang associates because they are all extremely knowledgeable about the gang violence between these two neighborhoods.

experience gave me access to several people in each of these sample groups. I also received the help of Anthony Braga, one of my thesis advisors, to contact several of my interview subjects, particularly those in law enforcement. Due to my thesis advisor's working relationship with the BPD, he was able to connect me with several of the law enforcement officers I interviewed. I then used a "snowball method" of finding more interview subjects, asking each of the individuals I interviewed for the names and contact information of other people who fit any of the three sample profiles. I continued this process until I exhausted the list of all suggested individuals and did not receive any new people to contact.

All of the interviews were conducted during January 2010. I conducted the majority of the interviews in person, with several being conducted over the phone for the convenience of my interview subjects. The in-person interviews were conducted at the offices of the interview subjects, a private room at the Phillips Brooks House Association (the nonprofit organization that sponsors my after-school program), or the Franklin Teen Center. All of the interview subjects were provided with a copy of my Interview Information Sheet before participating in an interview (attached as Appendix A). These were administered in person prior to the interviews being conducted, or via email for interviews being conducted over the phone. I obtained verbal consent from all of my interview subjects prior to participating in the interview. Due to the sensitive nature of this research, the IRB waived the requirement of signed consent forms since the interviews and data collected during them are confidential and having a signed document could be a potential security risk to the participants' confidentiality. The IRB did not consider there to be a danger associated with interviewing these individuals, which also

contributed to the elimination of a signed consent form. After obtaining verbal consent to participate, I asked each interview subject if they would allow me to record the interview so I could accurately portray their statements and views. However, I was unable to record interviews with any individuals in the former gang associate and longtime community member subject group since this was considered an added risk to these individuals by the IRB. For these individuals, I instead took copious notes throughout each interview.

Each interview subgroup had a specific interview guide that I created and followed to ensure consistency throughout this research process. The interview guides are attached as Appendix B. Each interview guide was tested with individuals from each population subgroup (i.e. a law enforcement officer, a youth worker, and a community member from a neighborhood similar to Franklin Hill and Franklin Field) prior to being used in my research. These tests helped ensure each population would properly understand my questions and that I would receive information about my desired research questions. For each interview, I asked a series of questions about the subject's background, their role in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, the nature of the gang rivalry, how the gang rivalry started, what actions precede and follow acts of gang violence, and the role of individuals in the gangs. Each interview took approximately one hour. Interview subjects in the former gang associates and longtime community member category were compensated with \$15 for participating in the interview. They were the only subject group to receive compensation. However, compensation was necessary to encourage individuals from this subject pool to speak with me since it was not related to their job and they would otherwise have little incentive to speak with me about this topic.

Qualitative Methods

I transcribed each of the interviews in documents in Microsoft Word. Each document was encrypted and stored on my personal computer, which was kept in a locked bedroom of a locked dorm room. These security precautions helped guarantee the confidentiality of my interview subjects' responses. Each interview subject and transcription was labeled with an alphanumeric identification number. The key to this code was not stored on the same computer where the actual transcriptions were stored to help protect the confidentiality of each participant. These computers were password protected and stored in the locked bedroom of a locked dorm room. These security measures were approved by the IRB.

After transcribing each interview, I coded them using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis program. My complete coding rubric of 87 codes, attached as Appendix C, mostly focused on identifying different motivating factors for specific incidents of gang violence (e.g. drugs, turf wars, interpersonal conflict, retaliation, etc.), the initial cause of the gangs originating and becoming violent (e.g. drugs, turf wars, interpersonal conflict, no clear reason, etc.), what the gang violence looks like, how gang violence has changed over time, the actions that precede and follow specific acts of gang violence (e.g. physical assault, nonfatal shooting, homicide, etc.), and the hierarchical roles within each gang. I chose to code for these factors because they allow me to answer my research questions regarding what sustains gang violence over time.

As mentioned earlier, the main research question I am focusing on is determining what continues youth gang violence over time; therefore, I focused my qualitative analysis on two of my distinct sub-questions. The first sub-question was the initial start of the gang violence between the FFB and FHG. In order to analyze what has sustained the

violence over time, we must understand how it began. I examined all of the data coded as “origins of gang violence” and compared the results across my three population samples. This analysis allowed me to outline all of the different reported causes of the initial gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and determine if different populations have similar or contrasting perspectives about the start of this violent feud. I then compared the results I found in my micro-level interviews with the current leading theory in the national and Boston literature of youth gang violence emerging due to the emergence of crack cocaine markets (e.g. Blumstein 1995, Cook and Laub 1998, Braga 2003).

The second component of my qualitative analysis focused on the continual violence between the two gangs since the initial violence. I examined all of the data coded as “cause of gang violence” and separated them by decade (i.e. 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) and sample population. By analyzing my data in this manner I was able to determine the motivating factors for violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field and see if these factors have changed over time. Further analyses also allowed me to compare the maintenance factors of gang violence (i.e. causes of gang violence over the past three decades) in this area to the development factors (i.e. origins of gang rivalry) and determine if and how they are related. I then analyzed whether the results of my micro-level analysis were consistent with theories in the literature about the continual nature of gang violence over time, including cultural explanations of status and respect (Anderson 1998) and retaliation (e.g. Gould 2003; Jacobs and Wright 2006). These analyses are discussed in greater detail in the “Results” and “Discussion and Conclusion” chapters of my thesis.

Quantitative Data

In order to most completely answer my research question about what sustains gang violence over time, I also collected and analyzed quantitative data about the violence between these two gangs. These analyses help to determine what role, if any, retaliation has in sustaining this violent gang rivalry, and what type of retaliation (i.e. reflexive or deferred) is used most frequently between these two gangs.

Geographical Dataset

In order to answer these research questions, I obtained two datasets describing the violence between the two gangs. The first dataset was geographically based and included all violent crimes (i.e. aggravated assault, rape and attempted rape, robbery, indecent A & B,⁵ homicide, shooting-ABDW,⁶ and shooting-homicide) from January 2004 to December 2009 in the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field areas. I received permission to analyze this data from Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis.

In order to obtain the geographical dataset about shootings and homicides in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, I provided the Boston Police Department with geographical boundaries of each gang's territory. I determined each gang's territorial boundaries based on a compilation of responses from my interview subjects about the gang turf borders. The areas I chose to examine are, to the best of my ability, accurate representations of the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field gang turfs.⁷ The digitized map in

⁵ "Indecent Assault and Battery"

⁶ "Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon," a nonfatal shooting

⁷ I also included Chez Vous Roller Skating Rink (depicted in Figure 3.1) in my geographical analysis because several of the individuals I interviewed described this area as a hot spot for violence between the Franklin gangs. Interestingly, there were no violent crimes of any type reported at Chez Vous during the six year period I analyzed. There are numerous reasons for the lack of reported crime at this location, including: the crimes are not violent enough to be included in these data, the crimes are not reported to the police, the crimes described to me occurred prior to 2004, or error in retrieving data about this area. Due to the lack of any type of crime in this area, I excluded Chez Vous from further quantitative analysis in my thesis.

Figure 3.1, provided by the Boston Police Department, show the borders of each specific area studied.

The data in this geographical dataset include the type of violent crime, the crime area (i.e. Franklin Hill Area, Franklin Field Area, or Chez Vous Roller Rink), and month and year of the crime. Unfortunately, the data are not more specific than monthly accounts, and do not include information about whether any of the parties involved were known gang members. However, these data cover a longer length of time and have a larger sample size than my other dataset. The data yielded 618 incidents of violent crime over the six year period. It is likely not all of these crimes were perpetrated by or against gang members from these two gangs because the data do not include information about the offenders, victims, or motive for the crime. In an effort to control for this, I chose to only analyze shootings in these geographical areas. “Shootings” include both “Shooting–ABDW” and “Shooting–Homicide” listed in the data. There were 43 shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field during the six year time span. Although there is more violence between gang associates than just shootings and homicides, these are the types of violence for which local law enforcement agencies have the most concrete, accurate data. Also, since the majority of the shootings committed by each gang occur on their turf or their rival’s, and since gangs commit the majority of shootings in the Franklin area (Braga 2003), it is logical to assume the majority of the shootings described in the data are committed by associates of FHG and FFB. Therefore, using only shooting and homicide data provides me with the most thorough and accurate picture of what gang-related violent crime looks like in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and was the focus of my quantitative analysis.

Person-Based Dataset

My second quantitative analysis used data on shootings in Boston provided by David Hureau of the Harvard Sociology Department, who works closely with the Boston Police Department. The data in David's possession was obtained from Boston shooting reports from January 2006 to September 2009. Although the length of time is extremely short, the data are extremely specific. The data are person-based, meaning shootings were only included in my data if at least one of the individuals involved in the shooting (offender or victim) was a known gang member of FHG or FFB. The data include the exact date, location, type of shooting (ABDW or Homicide), motivation for the shooting, and suspect and victim gang affiliations. The data yielded 17 shootings related to the FFB and FHG during this time period.

Quantitative Methods

Geographical Dataset

I analyzed the geographical dataset using statistical analyses to determine the type of shooting retaliations used between associates of Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. For the purposes of this geographical analysis, "retaliation" will be defined as a shooting in one neighborhood following a shooting in the opposite neighborhood. Analyses from the person-based dataset suggest gang-related shootings most often occur in the victim's gang territory; therefore, I will consider shootings in Franklin Hill to be shootings committed by FFB, and shootings in Franklin Field to be shootings by FHG. Since the data are only specific to months, this is the most specific level of analysis I can perform using this dataset. Reflexive retaliation will be defined as "a shooting in one neighborhood following a shooting in the opposing neighborhood during the same

month.” Short-term deferred retaliation will be defined as “a shooting in one neighborhood following a shooting in the opposing neighborhood within one month of the initial shooting,” and long-term deferred retaliation will be defined as “a shooting in one neighborhood following a shooting in the opposing neighborhood within two or three months of the initial shooting.”

In order to analyze the quantitative data, I created a descriptive statistical table and time series (shown in Chapter 6) to better examine the shooting trends in the geographical areas. I examined whether shootings were clustered in time (i.e. in the same month) or spread out over several months in order to determine if reflexive or deferred retaliation was occurring between the neighborhoods.

I conducted several regression analyses on the data to determine whether shooting retaliations between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are reflexive retaliations, short-term deferred retaliations, or long-term deferred retaliations. I conducted analyses of each type of shooting (i.e. all shootings, ABDW shootings, and homicide shootings) in one neighborhood with each type of shooting in the rival neighborhood at time months (t), ($t - 1$), ($t - 2$), and ($t - 3$).

Jacobs and Wright’s (2006) theories of retaliation suggest that although most street criminals desire to retaliate immediately after a crime is committed against them, there are often situational factors that prevent this from happening; therefore, it can take several weeks for retaliation to occur. By considering both the current and prior months’ incidents, I took this potential time lag into account in my analysis. These analyses will help determine if there are any shooting retaliations between the two gangs, and, if there are, the length of time between retaliations.

Person-Based Dataset

Due to the small sample size of the person-based dataset (17 shootings), I analyzed the data manually. I again focused on the two types of retaliation described in my literature review, “reflexive retaliation” and “deferred retaliation” (Wright 2006). I defined reflexive retaliation as “a shooting of one gang associate following a shooting of a rival gang associate within two weeks of the initial shooting.” Two weeks allows for enough time to pass that increased police presence, which could deter retaliatory shootings, could subside, and is short enough that prior shootings are still recent enough to play a role in fueling disputes. Deferred retaliation includes two different time frames, and will be defined as “a shooting of one gang associate following a shooting of a rival gang associate within the past 30 days and 60 days.” These time frames are as consistent as possible with the geographical dataset definitions of reflexive and deferred retaliation. As explained earlier, there are often situational factors that prevent an individual from retaliating immediately; therefore, this analysis will help take these factors into consideration to provide a more complete analysis of retaliatory shootings. I counted the number of shootings that are consistent with each definition of retaliation in order to determine how common reflexive and deferred retaliation are in the FHG and FFB gang rivalry.

By analyzing the data using varying time constraints on my definition of retaliation, I was able to determine if there appears to be retaliatory shootings between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and, if there are, which type of retaliation is most common. By learning which, if any, type of retaliation is most common, I can better understand what has sustained the violent rivalry between these two gangs over time.

These findings have important implications for policy recommendations about gang violence interventions.

Limitations

Limitations to Qualitative Data Analysis

As mentioned earlier, I was unable to interview any current gang associates or anyone affiliated with a gang in the previous five years due to IRB restrictions. This restriction limited my ability to understand the current motivations for gang violence because I did not have access to any firsthand, self-reported data. However, by interviewing youth workers and law enforcement personnel who have daily access to these individuals, I was able to learn the motivations for current gang violence based on their knowledge from years of observations and discussions with youth in these two gangs. Another limitation was my small sample size for both my interviews and quantitative data. However, due to the extremely sensitive nature of this topic, and the problem with people in the community feeling they would be “snitching” if they talked about the gang violence, it was difficult to find individuals willing to participate, particularly in the former gang associate sample. However, due to the specific, case study nature of my analysis, my data provides a thorough analysis of the factors that have sustained this violent gang rivalry because there are a finite number of people with knowledge of this topic.

Limitations to Geographical Data Analysis

The geographical data does not definitively classify each of the shootings as gang-related, therefore it is possible several of the shootings I included in my analysis were not gang-related. However, it is still important to examine the geographical trends of the

shootings in these areas since many of the gang-related shootings do occur in these public housing developments. Also, non-gang-related shootings that occur in the neighborhoods could be interpreted by gang associates as being shootings from rival gangs, suggesting it could be important to include all of these shootings in my analysis.

Another significant limitation to the data in the first analysis is the length of time covered by the data. Although the data includes all shootings from 2004 to 2009, it does not include any information about shootings in the 1990s or 1980s, which are extremely important decades to analyze in order to better determine if the trends of retaliation that could have sustained this gang violence have changed over time. Unfortunately, these data do not exist. Analyses like this show how important data collection is, and I hope the BPD and other police departments around the country continue to collect this type of data in the future so that time series analyses can be conducted with more reliable and helpful results.

Another limitation to the data is the geographical boundaries that I used to analyze the gang territories. Although these boundaries were created using information from numerous interview responses about this topic, it is possible gang-related shootings between these rival groups occurred in locations outside the two areas I included in my analyses. Therefore, I could be missing several key retaliatory shootings because they happened at other locations. As the data in my person-based analysis suggests, there are several shootings that occur outside the known gang turfs I included in my analysis. However, these territories were created to the best of my knowledge from numerous conversations with individuals from each interview population sample.

In this analysis I defined reflexive retaliation as shootings in rival neighborhoods occurring within the same month. It is possible a shooting could have occurred during the first few days of the month and therefore a shooting in the previous month would actually be a reflexive retaliation, not deferred. Fortunately, this is a small probability, and using simultaneous monthly shootings helps maintain consistent time periods throughout my various quantitative analyses.

A final limitation to this analysis is potential human error. It is possible I or the individuals providing me with numerical data incorrectly input the geographical location or codes for analysis, which would lead to incorrect results. However, I confirmed these analyses with my thesis advisor, Bruce Western, and to the best of my ability, there was no human error.

Limitations to Person-Based Data Analysis

The most significant limitation to the data in the person-based analysis is the extremely small sample size. Unfortunately, this type of specific data is only available from 2006 to September 2009, which means I could not analyze data in the beginning of the 2000s, or any of the 1990s and 1980s. Data from these time periods are important to analyze to better determine the effects, if any, of retaliatory shootings and how these effects may have changed over time to help sustain this violent gang rivalry.

Another limitation is I only have access to the data provided by the BPD, therefore if a victim or suspect was incorrectly identified as being (or not being) affiliated with one of these gangs, they would be incorrectly included in my analysis. However, I analyzed the data to the best of my ability given these potential constraints.

The final significant limitation to the data is there are several inconsistencies between the two datasets. For example, in May 2006 the first dataset contains two shootings in Franklin Hill and none in Franklin Field, while the person-based dataset lists five shootings during the same month. Two of the five shootings were outside the geographical range of my analysis, but the three shootings on May 1, 2006 were all within my geographical constraints and therefore should have been included in my dataset. Obviously, one of the two datasets is incorrect, but I unfortunately am unable to determine which is more correct. Fortunately, these inconsistencies did not occur all the time in the data, but inconsistencies such as this could have a severe impact on the validity of my analyses. I recommend future police departments to maintain more uniform and accurate records of all of these types of violent crimes to allow better analyses to be conducted on them that could improve our understanding of the violent gang rivalries in Boston.

Chapter 4: Origins of the Violent Gang Rivalry

One of the key parts of determining what sustains gang violence over time is determining what started it in the first place. Every subject I interviewed agreed the FFB and FHG emerged in the 1980s, around the time when most gangs in Boston were surfacing. However, there is great disparity amongst the individuals I spoke with, both within and across subject groups, as to the origins of this specific gang rivalry.

Drugs and Turf Disputes

Despite admitting to being somewhat unsure of the specific nature of the origins of the gang violence between the FFB and FHG, the majority of the law enforcement sample population believed drugs and turf disputes were involved. When asked how the rivalry between the FHG and the FFB started, Officer Julio Baconte replied, “Definitely drugs, gangs, territory. That’s what [the rivalry] is.” He explained how the rivalry became violent because of competition over drug turf, particularly crack cocaine and marijuana:

What’s the best way to monopolize something? Get rid of your competition. So who knows? Someone stepped across the street, aha, now I have reason to go over there and hurt somebody. And it all came back to competition—who was selling their crack cocaine, their marijuana, at a cheaper price. Who actually has it. Because if you’re alive you have it, and if you’re dead you don’t.

Other members of the law enforcement population shared similar theories about the origins of the gang violence in this area. One law enforcement officer attributed the start of the gang rivalry to there being “more drug wars, territorial issues, more than anything else” as the key problem. Nicholas Matthews described, “Back in the older days [violence] was all about money. Each crew made their money, they sold their drugs, they made their money.” He continued, “If someone had to be taken care of it was because of money, where now it’s not that way.” As Jon Stall explained, “Most gangs in Boston

began to emerge in the early 80s and it all involved drug deals, money, and protecting your drug turf.” He continued to describe how “the gangs existed to support the drug trade and the violence existed to maintain their piece of the pie.” Officer Stall attributed the spikes in Boston homicides during the early 1990s to these drug turf wars. Officer Matthews explained although there were more homicides in the 1980s and 1990s, they were targeted and justified because of the drug wars: “People were being killed for a reason, you’re fucking with someone’s [drug] money, where now it’s not about money, you’re getting killed over petty things.”

Similar to several of the law enforcement subjects, numerous youth workers cited drugs and turf disputes as main causal factors in the origination of this gang rivalry. As Darren Rosse explained, “A lot of people believe it’s crack cocaine hit in the 80s, there was a surge of violence and drug-based violence in that period of time.” He went on to explain how various gangs emerged as large drug traffickers at this time, including the Jamaican Posses, as well as members of the mafia and Irish cartel. In order to combat these rival drug distributors, “Hill and Field boys is raising in the midst of that to defend their own territory and taking on gang characteristics as a result,” explained Rosse. Another youth worker, Sean Collins, described how “the drug game used to be violent, but the game’s changed.” He cited drug violence as one of the main causes of the gang rivalry, with individuals from each housing development fighting for turf and buyers.

The former gang member and longtime community member sample almost unanimously agreed that drugs and turf disputes played a significant role in starting the violent gang rivalry between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. One former gang associate explained during the beginning of the rivalry they would “sell cocaine, and use violence

to muscle out the competition.” Jamal Thompson, another former gang associate, described the role of drugs in starting the gang rivalry:

Drugs had a big role. They were a quick way to make money. Crack had just hit back then, and you could become a financial guru overnight. You’d make some quick money and didn’t have to leave the projects. If you had a strong supplier, then you always had product. But you need a means to distribute the product. You have Blue Hill, the projects are sold up, Franklin Hill, Franklin Field, so you start branching out. Now it’s like, ‘we’re selling here, too, my man we been here, you cuttin’ plays off, someone has to go.’

This explanation means that there was competition over drug turf, and individuals became violent with one another to protect and take over different territories within and surrounding these two public housing developments. Bryan Jacobs described a similar story about the role of drugs in the origins of this gang rivalry based on knowledge from growing up in one of the Franklin public housing developments:

Drugs played a major role in the gang rivalry. Like I explained earlier, it was all about respect. When one neighborhood was pushing more drugs and getting the recognition for it, or what they would call ‘street credit,’ the other neighborhoods would try to defend what they’d already made their marks on, and would go after them. A way that they’d go after them is doing a drive by, beating up a member of the opposite gang.

When asked to describe how the violent gang rivalry between the FFB and FHG started, Le’Sean Williams, a former Franklin gang associate, also confirmed the drug turf dispute as the main cause of tension and violence. He explained:

The drug trade was strong in the late 80s, early 90s. You know Franklin Field was up there, Franklin Hill was you know doing their thing, Franklin Field started to flourish in the drug trade. Franklin Hill didn’t like, well they said, ‘We’re gonna come down here and we’re gonna sell, too,’ and it’s like, ‘No you’re not,’ you know, so that kind of started the feud here.

Due to the high number of reports of drugs and turf disputes by individuals from all three population samples, it appears they played a key role in the development of this violent gang rivalry.

Specific Incident

Several members of the law enforcement personnel believe the FFB and FHG rivalry originated over a specific, violent incident, but one that happened so far in the past that it is forgotten. Officer Ryan Jacobs explained that despite knowing the definitive causes of several other notorious gang rivalries in Boston, “That one I don’t cause it’s been going on for so long. I can’t point to a specific incident to say that’s what kicked it off, like so and so got stabbed, so and so got killed, or robbed, which makes it more difficult to get at the root cause.” Officer Rob Taylor had a similar explanation, explaining how “I can’t tell you if it goes back to a specific incident, a specific event, the way some of the other gangs do in the city.” Jon Stall suggested, “It’s probably one person shot another and you know their friends got together versus their friends, it just started tit for tat. You shoot my friend, I shoot your friend. And it got so bad that I think they’ve really forgotten what the original beef was about.”

One law enforcement officer offered a specific violent incident as the root cause of the violent gang rivalry. Nicholas Matthews described a 2004 incident as the main impetus for the ongoing violence:

Jamal “Animal” Allan, who was a Franklin Field associate was rumored to have gotten beat down by Franklin Hill associates, either at Dorchester High or Dorchester Court. That night, associates from Franklin Field went up to the Hill and killed William Saladin, whose nickname was Spill. So that I think was probably the one thing that really set this beef to the point where it will never die.

By far the most unique explanation of the origin of this violent gang rivalry was given by a youth worker, Sean Collins. Far from the other descriptions of drugs and turf disputes, Sean's description of the start of the rivalry involved a specific personal dispute:

The original Hill and Field beef—it started over a cheeseburger. I can't really say more than that, but it started over some food. It was in the late 80s, early 90s. Was a woman involved? Maybe. Were there 2 guys involved? Obviously. But it was over something stupid, something about food. And after you know you heard about 'my cousin got stabbed,' that's what causes all this back and forth beef, but why did it all start back in the day? Over a cheeseburger.

Unfortunately, Sean was unable to discuss more specific details about the incident on the record, but this is an extremely specific, distinct theory for what caused the violent gang rivalry between the FHG and FFB to begin. This theory is also closely aligned with another youth worker's response about shame. Darren Rosse believes, "You're not gonna find any consistent [origin of this gang rivalry] unless you go back to Gilligan. And if you trace it down, you're gonna find that somebody with low self esteem to begin with got disrespected." Gilligan's theory, which was outlined earlier in the "Literature Review" chapter of this thesis, states that all violence is rooted in one individual being shamed by another, and the only way for the shamed individual to regain his or her self-respect and confidence is to lash out with violence. This theory also could be consistent with the cheeseburger story described by Sean.

No individuals from the former gang associates population sample offered a specific incident as the root cause of the violent rivalry between FFB and FHG.

Structural Problems

Another common theory raised by individuals in the law enforcement sample was the structural nature of public housing developments. Officer Rob Taylor explained how

important the “physical proximity and the locations” of the two developments in this case study are, stating how “a rivalry almost is natural when you have two places with the same name that close to each other.” Officer Julio Baconte described the two developments as “public housing, which are breeding grounds, unfortunately, for gangs.”

One youth worker focused on the plethora of structural problems facing individuals living in public housing developments. When asked to describe how the gang violence began, Dominic Reese replied, “How [the violence] began is a sociology paper in itself. Lower income, social and economic isolation, lack of and poor resources, few opportunities for the youth—you get the picture.”

Mitch Penny, a former gang associate, described a tense living situation between the two developments leading to issues of disrespect and ultimately violence:

There’s always a housing development that’s built first you know, and then another one comes along that might be a little bit more up to date or newer and that always causes problems because you know we live here, why can’t we have that, and then being in such close proximity—that’s another thing, a lot of housing developments are in such close proximity to each other and you know sooner or later you know it could be over anything, basketball, sports, it could be over a girl, over a guy, you know anything basically. It starts off slow, fist fights or people gettin’ jumped, then it escalates to really bad jumpings or somebody gets stabbed or something then someone gets shot. Once someone gets shot, it really doesn’t matter who starts it at that point, it’s just now almost at the point of no return.

This cycle of violence will be addressed later in my thesis, but it is important to note how these structural factors and issues of disrespect could have served as the catalyst for violence. Once the groups escalated to violence, as Mitch described, the cycle became “generational.”

Crips and Bloods

A unique explanation for the origin of this gang rivalry is that it is a subset of the national Crips and Bloods rivalry. According to Officer Baconte, Boston has “options of Crips and Bloods. If they name themselves Bloods or Crips then everybody knows it’s them, so they’ve changed their names,” but “one [of the Franklin developments] was the Bloods and the other one was definitely the Crips.” Despite being the only law enforcement officer to bring up this theory, several other interview respondents in the other subject groups mentioned the Crips and Bloods playing a role in the founding of these two gangs.

Several of the youth workers I interviewed also mentioned the Crips and Bloods gangs. However, in stark contrast to what Officer Baconte explained, the youth workers described a different interaction between the Franklin gangs and Bloods and Crips. Instead of describing them as one in the same, the youth workers described how the Bloods and Crips attempted to take over the Franklin gangs, but failed. Sean Collins described how back in the 1980s, “Bloods tried to get in with the Latinos in Franklin Field. But the Hill and the Field actually worked together and kicked them out. They called each other and got help from each other, kicked them out, then went back to their beef.” Dave Lee, a local youth worker, echoed these sentiments, explaining how “[the FHG and FFB rivalry] was not Crips and Bloods, although Crips and Bloods have tried to surface.”

Unknown Origin

Several of the individuals I interviewed claimed to have no knowledge of the beginning of the gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. A former gang associate, Andre Mills, actually described an alliance between the two groups prior to the

violence beginning, explaining to me that “the two gangs were one at one point in time, they were one people. People had cousins, girlfriends, best friends living across the street, and one day they started shooting at each other. It was so long ago, I can’t even remember why it actually started.” Another former gang associate, Deshawna Walker, shared a similar perspective, explaining, “I don’t know what caused it all to start, like I said, it was just something that I always knew like, the Hill and Field do not like each other.”

Current Generation of Franklin Hill and Franklin Field Associates

In addition to describing their own experiences, the people I interviewed also commented on current teenagers involved in the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field gangs. According to my interview subjects, the current youth have no knowledge of how or why the feud between the two neighborhoods began, but they eagerly participate in it. Officer Rob Taylor commented, “And you know my sense is that if you sat down and talked to them that they wouldn’t be able to give you a really good explanation as to why the, you know, why the rivalry exists.” Youth worker Casey Donovan echoed these sentiments, explaining, “Lots of cats don’t know the real history, how the real beef started. Some of the OGs, like the old school gangsters, some of them try instill it into them, some of the kids listen, some don’t.” Dave Lee elaborated on this idea, explaining:

Now you’ve got 15 and 16 year olds reppin’ the Hill and the Field on principle, just because they’re from the neighborhood. Now it’s you know, my uncle got shot, my aunt got cut, my cousin’s been jumped or stabbed—it’s very real to them. But they have no idea why it all actually started.

Officer Nicholas Matthews expressed this idea, as well. When asked to describe how the violence between the FFB and the FHG began, he answered, ‘These younger

kids still don't know why they're fighting." He continued to recount a conversation he had with a Franklin gang associate:

They say, 'That's the Hill, they're bitches, we have to fight with them. That's just how it is, that's how it's always gonna be.' 'But why are you fighting?' 'I have no idea, cause they're bitches!'

Following his description of the original cause of the violent gang rivalry being the murder of William "Spill" Saladin, Officer Matthews lamented how the current youth are ignorant about the incident:

And the sad thing is a lot of the kids today who are in it don't realize that I don't like the Hill or the Field because of this, because they killed Spill. I mean everyone knows who Spill is, but it means, Spill to them means it's just another guy from the Hill and we just gotta do this because it's always been done.

Due to IRB restrictions, I was unable to interview any minors or current gang associates and therefore was not able to obtain firsthand knowledge about why current youth and gang associates believe the violent gang rivalry began in Franklin. However, the insight from the three population groups I was able to speak with provided numerous anecdotes about their experiences speaking about this topic with minors and current gang associates.

Conclusion

As stated earlier, it is important to start from the beginning and determine the root cause of this violent gang rivalry in order to examine what has sustained the violence between the FFB and FHG. These interviews provided me with numerous explanations about the start of the violent rivalry. The five main reasons given for the beginning of this violent gang rivalry are disputes over drugs and turf, a specific incident initiating the violence, Crips and Bloods starting rival gangs, structural problems with the two

neighborhoods, and other unknown causes. By far the most popular response was drugs and turf disputes starting the violent gang rivalry in the 1980s. Now that all of the possible explanations of the origins of the gang violence from my interview sample have been described, I will move on to examining the current motivations for violence between the two gangs.

Chapter 5: The Continuity of the Violent Gang Rivalry

The second key component of my qualitative data focuses on understanding the continuity of the violence between the FFB and FHG by exploring the motivating factors for current incidents of gang violence. By examining the causes of gang violence since the 1980s when these gangs first emerged, I can determine if the reasons for current gang violence are similar to or contrast with the original development of this gang rivalry. This analysis will allow me to determine what has sustained the gang violence over time.

Shift from Drugs to Interpersonal Disputes

As explained in the previous chapter, the law enforcement sample I interviewed explained the majority of the gang violence in the 1980s was rooted in drug- and turf-related disputes. However, when these individuals were asked follow-up questions about whether drugs and turf disputes continue to have an influential role in starting gang violence, they explained how the motivations changed in the 1990s and 2000s to retaliation against interpersonal disputes.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Officer Jon Stall described how “most of [the violence] was gang related and drugs. The gangs existed to support the drug trade and the violence existed to maintain their piece of the pie.” The violence was over “money and drugs and turf.” When asked if protecting drug turf was still a factor in gang violence today, Officer Stall replied, “It’s interpersonal conflict. It’s not really protecting drug turf, it’s things most adults can resolve other ways. Girlfriends, you know, feeling disrespected.” Officer Rob Taylor described a very similar progression of gang violence, explaining how the violence between the Franklin gangs in the 1980s “was more associated with drug trafficking.” However, when asked if drug trafficking continued to play a role in the gang violence since the 1980s, he replied:

Today it seems like the violence tends to be more relationship based. Although there's still elements—you know, a bunch of the shootings and homicides in [the Franklin] area over the last couple years appear to have been business related. But a lot more of it now appears to be you know, 'You looked at me the wrong way, you had a fight with my girl, you gave me a dirty look when I passed you on Blue Hill Avenue,' and stuff like that.

Officer Ryan Jacobs echoed these sentiments, explaining how “the drugs [were] the financial end of it and now violence is just personal beef.” Officer Matthews described an almost identical progression of the gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field:

Each crew made their money, they sold their drugs, they made their money. If someone had to be ‘taken care of’⁸ it was because of money, where now it's not that way. It could be, ‘That's my girlfriend, you stepped on my shoes, you disrespected me.’ So I think that's, if you talk to some of those dudes who've been in the game longer, the feeling is it's worse now.

Officer Cameron Jackson also focused on the shift from violence over drug money to violence over more trivial, interpersonal issues:

So it's no longer, I mean drugs is big, but drugs is just means for them to get their guns, get their clothes, whereas before, the violence wasn't as bad, I don't think the violence was as bad. Again you talk to people who were cops in the 80s and 90s they'll say it was crazy but it was a different kind of crazy. People were being killed for a reason, you're fucking with someone's money, where now it's not about money, you're getting killed over petty things.

The youth worker subpopulation shared these beliefs. Sean Collins explained, “The drug game used to be violent, but the game's changed. Now you look at someone wrong, you said something to someone's sister, or disrespected someone's girl over there, now there's beef.” Former gang associates also agreed the drug game used to be the

⁸ Slang for “punished with violence” or “killed.”

primary cause of violence, but now, “These kids see the rap videos and the fame and they want that—so they get it by shooting each other over stupid shit,” explained Andre Mills.

In summary, these interviews support the existing literature that gang violence during the 1990s and 2000s is actually not related to drug dealing and turf disputes. In the 1980s, drugs and turf disputes appear to have been one of the main causes of gang violence. However, my interviews suggest current gang violence is more relationship-based, stemming from interpersonal disputes over issues of disrespect.

Retaliation

It seems very clear from the aforementioned interview responses that the motivation for violence between the FFB and FHG shifted during the early 1990s from drug and turf-based violence to retaliation for interpersonal disputes. In order to examine the effect of retaliation on sustaining gang violence, I asked respondents from each sample population questions about the aftermath of different types of incidents between the rival gangs. I focused on any retaliatory actions following disrespectful words, physical beatings without guns, nonfatal shootings, and fatal shootings.

Retaliation for Nonviolent Disrespect

As was explained in the preceding section about the shift from drug-related violence to interpersonal conflicts, the majority of the violence stems from retaliation regarding interpersonal disputes and acts of disrespect. According to the law enforcement population, most of the nonviolent disrespect occurs in shouting matches or bumping into someone on the street. Gang associates often use derogatory language to describe the rival gang. Officer Nicholas Matthews described a prime example of this when members

of these two gangs would encounter each other on the street or in court, yelling, “We’re the Hill, fuck the Field, we’re the Field, fuck the Hill.” He continued to explain how the Franklin Field Boyz refer to the Franklin Hill Giants as “the Franklin Hill Midgets” in an attempt to disrespect them. These derogatory comments will often escalate into physical violence as the individuals who were disrespected seek revenge. If they are in a setting where weapons are not permitted, such as school or court, “They’ll banter back and forth, talk shit to each other, and get in a fist fight,” explained Officer Matthews. Officer Ryan Jacobs agreed with these sentiments, explaining how violent retaliation is very common following nonviolent disrespect. However, it is only weaponless violence if it occurs in a setting where individuals have been searched for weapons. “If it’s on the street, somebody’s gettin’ stabbed. And that’s, that’s gonna be [caused by] some words. Those are usually the unplanned ones, I mean, if it’s a planned event, someone’s bringing a gun,” explained Officer Jacobs.

Officer Julio Baconte described how somewhat trivial things might be considered acts of disrespect by gang associates, warranting violent acts of retaliation: “Somebody picked up the wrong back pack, someone bought the last pack of gum, you know, the silliest of things.” He described another story in which a Franklin Hill gang associate “got into a fight over his girlfriend who he was dating for two days, cause someone looked at her.” According to Officer Jon Stall, “It wouldn’t take much [to start a physical fight]. It’s an argument at a party, it’s hittin’ on someone else’s girlfriend at a party.”

Although the most frequently cited retaliations for nonviolent disrespect were physical beatings, jumpings, and stabbings, there were several individuals who explained how nonviolent disrespect could cause a retaliatory shooting. According to Officer

Baconte, “When they get into a lot of verbal confrontations, and if they’re gang affiliated, we know there’s gonna be some shootings.” As described earlier, Officer Taylor expressed concern over the shifting motivation of gun-related crimes from drugs to retaliation for nonviolent disrespect:

A lot more of [the shootings and homicides] now appear to be you know, ‘You looked at me the wrong way, you had a fight with my girl, you gave me a dirty look when I passed you on Blue Hill Avenue,’ and stuff like that.

The youth worker population focused a great deal on nonviolent disrespect leading to violence, including both physical (non gun-related) violence and shootings. One of the most commonly mentioned forms of disrespect was verbal rumors. Darren Rosse described a typical day’s work with youth from Franklin Hill and Franklin Field:

We used to spend a lot of time just on rumors, just squashing beefs. ‘Oh, so at the end of the school day you heard what? Is that really so? Is somebody really after somebody’s boyfriend or girlfriend?’ It’s those types of things that led to the type of beef that caused violence.

The types of violence described by Darren included physical beatings, stabbings, and, occasionally, shootings. Charles Wells described a similar setting, with physical beatings, stabbings, and shootings being caused by “misinformation and rumors.” Sean Collins described an example of how a simple act of disrespect could escalate into extremely violent shootings:

It could be a simple beef that sparks something. Let’s say we’re from the Field and you’re my girl, and someone from the Hill disrespects you. Now, I can’t let them be talkin’ ‘bout my girl like that, so I come back at them, and I get beat up, they own me. Now it’s a personal beef, a this day and time beef. Now I gotta rep my hood, and I’ll go back and step to my guys and get them involved and we’ll go through⁹ the Field cause you can’t disrespect me or my girl. So I’m reppin’ my hood, but it’s got nothing to do with it, it’s personal. This is what young people are faced with now.

⁹ Slang for drive-by shooting.

Dominic Reese described numerous stories where individuals had been shot because of “disrespect in any form,” with the retaliation being more violent if more gang associates were involved. Dave Lee explained, “Lots of kids don’t know how to defend themselves. But if you look at them wrong, it’s on.” The retaliation for nonviolent disrespect used to be a “fair one”—a fight without weapons to truly test an individual’s strength and fighting skill. Throughout the past two decades, “Guys can’t fight, they don’t know how, so they use guns,” explained Sean Collins. Officer Stall agreed with this theory, recalling how one Franklin gang associate told him, “We don’t give fair ones, we give farewells,” implying they now only use guns to retaliate against rival gangs for acts of nonviolent disrespect.

Former gang associates and longtime community members described how disrespect could be as simple as claiming you were from a rival neighborhood. Deshawna Walker described what could cause a physical fight between associates of the Franklin gangs:

Just knowing that they’re from either side, that’s all it is. Because that’s what they do. You can be walkin’ down the street, minding your own business, and like I’ve seen it happen before, somebody will come up like, ‘Where are you from?’ and they’ll be like, ‘I’m from the Hill or the Field,’ and like, if that’s the wrong answer, that’s it, that’s all it takes.

Le’Sean Williams described how “major disrespect or someone feel[ing] humiliated” could lead to an extremely violent act of retaliation, including homicide, if the person is impulsive. Bryan Jacobs, a former Franklin gang associate, described how much more violent the retaliation is for today’s youth than when he was involved in the

gang rivalry in the 1980s. When he was involved in gang violence, acts of nonviolent disrespect, or beef, were settled with weaponless fights, but today's youth use guns:

The carnage has really escalated over the years. Back in the day we used to give each other passes, there were rules back then, unspoken rules that were taught and passed down. You didn't snitch, you didn't shoot at someone when they were with their mom, their child, their family. If you had a beef, you do fist and cuffs right there. Not anymore. Now you've got these damn cowboys and Indians out here playing and they're playing for keeps.¹⁰

In summary, there appears to be a great deal of gang violence in recent years due to retaliation for nonviolent disrespect. These acts of retaliation are most often physical fights or stabbings, but frequently escalate to shootings or homicides.

Retaliation for Violence without Guns

The majority of interview subjects in all three population groups agreed when a gang associate is physically assaulted by associates of a rival gang without guns, the retaliation escalates to gun violence. As Officer Stall explained, "The losing side always wants to even the score," and they do this by "assault[ing] the other group, usually with an escalation with the type of weapons." Officer Cameron Jackson described a typical escalation scenario: "If I get beat up at the train station, it depends on who I am as a kid, that depends what I do next. Either me and my friends are gonna jump¹¹ this dude, or I'm gonna go this time and do a mission¹² cause I'm embarrassed."

Almost every person in the law enforcement sample knew of at least one story in which a person had been physically assaulted without weapons and either he or his fellow gang associates retaliated with guns. The 2003 William "Spill" Saladin incident

¹⁰ Shooting to kill.

¹¹ Stab.

¹² Intentional shooting, usually a drive-by.

mentioned in the previous chapter by Officer Nicholas Matthews is an example of this type of retaliation.

Officer Jackson explained, “I worked with one kid [associated with Franklin Hill] who shot at a group of kids from Franklin Field just because he got beat up on the train a couple times.” Officer Jacobs described another escalation after a weaponless attack:

Everybody’s calling everybody goin’, ‘Hey, those kids moved on¹³ so and so,’ and whatever, and a lot of times then it’s the next level. That’s when you see the planned thing where they come through and they’re gonna do some shootings—shootings where they wanna show they’ve shot back. Other times it’s a drive through so they can say we went through there, but only if the person wasn’t hurt badly.

Officer Matthews described an escalation from nonviolent disrespect to weapons: “You’re gonna get the ‘fuck you’ stuff back and forth, it may even become into a fistfight, but, that’s about it. Depending on who got the better of who, who’s angry, then they may come back with pistols.”

The youth worker population described similar retaliation and anecdotes. Charles Wells explained how a shooting homicide could be caused by a “physical confrontation. Could be a fight, or jumping with one person being in the wrong place at the wrong time and they’re beat on sight.” Sean Collins explained the aftermath of a physical beating without guns: “When it gets bad, it escalates, but if I get punked, I’ll eat that one. But if there’s scars that can’t be hidden, then things’ll escalate.” The escalation he describes is an escalation to shootings.

There are some incidents in which the retaliation for a physical altercation without a gun is more violence without guns. This retaliation seems particularly true in schools. Dominic Reese describes the response to a fight without guns:

¹³ Slang for assaulted or beat up.

It's more assaults or some sort of altercation. Guy gets injured, be it physically or pride-wise, you know, challenged, and you can't have that. My teens have talked about guys showing up at folks' schools and literally waiting all day for retribution. There are allies where they show up to brawl...sounds like some bad scene from a 1990 gang flick, but it happens.

The former gang associates and longtime community member population explained the majority of physical beatings not involving guns have a retaliation of equal level. After a physical fight without guns, Jamal Thompson explained, "You go back, get your boys, and go look for me, and next week you get even." Jamal described an example from his own life about this type of retaliation:

There was an incident at Chez Vous¹⁴, the Giants frequent there. I was there with my little sister, and I bumped into someone there. You know, we were skating on those stupid things, and I slipped and it was an accident and bumped into someone. Then the guy sucker punched me, so I called my mom, had her pick my sister and me up. This happened on a weekend, like Friday or Saturday. Then on Monday or Tuesday I was in Mattapan Square and saw the guy again. I was 15 or 16, and I said something about it to some of the older guys, they said, 'C'mon, let's go take care of that,' so we went and beat him up.

Mitch Penny explained how gang violence is extremely retaliatory, with a seemingly never-ending cycle of violence:

It's a cycle, it's like, people will like, I beat you up, then more people come and try to beat me up, it's back and forth, it just keeps on going. And like sometimes it ends, sometimes it finally does when somebody ends up dying.

However, there are occasions when the losing party retaliates with an escalation in weapons, resulting in the use of firearms. Andre Mills explained how in the past retaliation always started with weaponless fights, but escalated depending on the severity of the incident:

¹⁴ A local roller skating rink.

Back then you could ask for a fair one, you know a one on one, no weapons. It happened a lot at Lafayette¹⁵ downtown. It was an on-sight thing. It was always fist and cuffs¹⁶ first, unless you shot me or stabbed me, then it's gonna escalate. Then it's enough is enough, we bought some new guns, let's go try them out. So Friday night we go on a mission.

Le'Sean Williams also described an escalation in violence to shootings as retaliation for a physical beating:

It can escalate, you know they might drive through or they might, it's a little bit different, it's a lot harder to do drive by shootings now because of all the patrols, but now a lot of gangs are trying to track your progression—where you're gonna be, you go to school this way, you go home this way, you work this way, your girlfriend lives here, your boyfriend lives there, you know? It's a lot easier to take advantage of that than a full on assault in the opposition's place of residence

In summary, the majority of the law enforcement and youth worker samples believe retaliation following violence that does not involve a gun usually escalates to a shooting. Former gang associates and longtime community members believe gang violence in the 1980s only occasionally escalated to shootings depending on the severity of the initial attack, but now frequently escalates to shootings in response to a fight without guns.

Retaliation for Nonfatal Shootings

The majority of all three interview subject groups seem to agree there is always retaliation following a nonfatal shooting, and the retaliation is always another shooting. The shootings occasionally result in someone being killed, but it appears most of the shootings either miss or nonfatally wound the target.

When asked to describe what happens after an associate of one gang is nonfatally shot, three of the law enforcement subjects I interviewed explained, “You shoot my

¹⁵ A shopping mall in Boston.

¹⁶ A “fair one” or one-on-one weaponless fight.

friend, I shoot your friend.” Officers Rob Taylor and Ryan Jacobs described the trend of shootings as “tit for tat,” with most shootings followed by, “Let’s get them back.” Officer Julio Baconte described how the gang associates of the injured individual’s gang react with “revenge” by “shooting back.” Officer Nicholas Matthews described an in-depth example of this retaliation:

Say an associate from the Hill gets shot, and they think the Field did it. They might not know the Field did it, but they’re gonna roll through the Field and shoot one of their guys. That’s just one of those back and forth things. I think for the most part the Hill has won those. If the Field thinks the Hill shot one of their guys, they’re gonna roll through. It may not be today it may not be tomorrow, but the Hill’s always gonna wonder, ‘Alright, if we just shot, are they coming by?’

Officer Matthews continued to explain that if there is a shooting and no one is struck by the bullet, there is not as great of a demand for immediate retaliation. He explained, “If no one gets hit it might be quiet for a little bit, but you know eventually the crew that was just dumped on *has* to come back, they have to, that’s just the way it is.”

An interesting component of the retaliation is the intention of the retaliatory shooting. I asked the interview subjects what the goal of the retaliatory shootings was—to nonfatally wound an individual, or to kill the individual? Almost every member of the law enforcement sample group explained how all shootings are intended to kill the opposition, but they frequently miss or fail in their mission. As Officer Baconte explained, “I’ve yet to see anyone who shoots not to kill.” They admitted some individuals try much harder to kill during their retaliatory actions by shooting the victim several times at extremely close range, which they interpret as an obvious intent to kill. However, most of the retaliatory shootings are from a distance, and, despite the fact that the individuals are trying to shoot and kill their opponents, rarely succeed.

The youth worker population sample explained a very similar retaliation. When asked to describe the reaction after a nonfatal shooting between these two gangs, Darren Rosse replied, “Crack back. I mean, the codes of the street demand it.” He continued, “He’s been disrespected, pullin’ that pop the cap on me and I don’t retaliate or somebody doesn’t, you know somebody from the group or from the side doesn’t, then we’re weak.” As Sean Collins explained earlier, one of the main reasons current youth are joining these gangs and participating in the violence is because of the demand for retaliation for incidents such as, “My uncle got shot, my aunt got cut, my cousin’s been jumped or stabbed.”

The former gang associate and longtime community member population described similar patterns to the youth worker and law enforcement population samples. They explained how the majority of nonfatal shootings are retaliated with more shootings. When asked to describe the reaction of a gang after an associate is shot, Anthony Berry responded:

Once a shooting happens, especially if somebody gets shot, they’ll just do the *exact* same thing. And the thing about it is, they’re not even considerate for the other people around, like there are kids like, parents and grandparents around, that have nothing to do with anything, but out of anger they just, the thing about it is that, they won’t target anybody specific. Like if you’re from the Field and I just came and shot in the Field, you’re just gonna go and shoot in the Hill, and that’s what happens.

Justin Mitchell explained that often retaliation often happens in the form of drive by shootings: “Cars will come through, especially if [one gang] know[s] that [the rival gang] hang[s] out on the side street or a back area, those are like prime targets as opposed to just riding through the development cause there’s a pretty big risk with that.” In describing his former gang life, Jamal Thompson explained, “If you and I are rivals, and

I'm on the block, if you do a drive by, I know who you are, I know the car you drive, so if something happens, my crew and I know who it is that did it. And we'll retaliate."

However, Jamal also explained how occasionally retaliation comes in a serious but nonviolent form:

If you have beef with me, you shoot me, then I come back at you more powerful, and you bit off more than you chew. So now what do you do? You call 9-1-1, and tell them you heard people shooting guns and you turn me in.

In summary, the majority of all subjects from all sample populations believe retaliation is a frequent and necessary reaction to a nonfatal shooting. The acts of retaliation are most often equal to the initial reaction, and therefore are nonfatal shootings. Although the goal of the retaliation is most often to kill someone, the shooters rarely succeed. Occasionally, an individual will retaliate with a homicide.

Retaliation for Fatal Shootings

All members of the former gang associate and longtime community member sample concluded the retaliation for a gang associate from one side being killed is a gang associate from the rival gang being killed. When asked what the reaction is to a fellow gang associate being killed by a rival gang, Anthony Berry replied, "It's an eye for an eye. If you get one of us, we get one of you. The body count out here is ridiculous." Deshawna Walker's response to the same question was similar to Anthony's, explaining, "The same thing! It's a cycle, they just go back and forth shootin'."

The level of one's relationship to the victim has great significance in the role of retaliation. Jamal Thompson explained, "If someone killed someone close to you, you have to deal with it." Le'Sean Williams agreed with this idea, stating the cause of a fatal shooting could be "someone else being killed. If something happened to a family

member, it's really like tender." Justin Mitchell was asked to describe the reaction of a gang after an associate had been killed by a member of a rival gang. He explained how crimes against your family or closest friends merited extreme efforts of retaliation to ensure the offender was murdered, while a homicide of a member of your gang you were not close to might only merit an attempt at killing someone from the opposite gang:

There are stone cold killers, but those are few and far between. Some individuals are shooting just to shoot. But the stone cold killers will come up and give it to you. It only really happens if someone killed a close friend of yours, or someone died in your arms—but then they might walk up to you and shoot you in your car.

One of the other significant changes from gang violence in the past is that retaliation for a homicide of a gang associate used to be the shooting or homicide of an associate of the rival gang. However, individuals from each interview population described how current gang members will shoot anyone from the opposing gang's territory, regardless of whether or not they are affiliated with the gang. Jamal explained how this was part of the "rules back then, unspoken rules that were taught and passed down," including not shooting at a rival gang associate "when they were with their mom, their child, their family," but he lamented that current youth do not abide by these rules anymore. Youth worker Charles Wells also described these rules of the gangs, and agreed the current youth have abandoned them:

Gang members have their own culture, their own rules, and if you're not aware of that then it doesn't make sense to you, but to them it makes sense. There are retribution killings, I'm sad to say. Back in the 80s if someone from your crew was killed, you killed someone from their crew, but only someone who was involved in the life. Now there's a lack of cohesion, lack of structure, lack of trust, lack of honor, lack of courage, lack of discipline, there's no hierarchy or point person in these groups. It's significantly different. Back in the 80s there used to be camaraderie, now it's a loose association. Now they only get together to party, to take

care of something that happened to one of their members, but often it's just misinformation.

Charles went on to recall a recent incident in which an individual who was not affiliated with either gang became the victim of retaliation: "A young man from Franklin Field was killed within the last two years because a member of Franklin Hill was killed and the next day this man was killed even though he had nothing to do with it."

Individuals from the law enforcement population concurred retaliation for homicide has always been to shoot back, and to shoot to kill. However, several of these interview subjects agreed current gang associates will kill anyone in the opposing neighborhood's territory, even if they are not affiliated with the rival gang. Both Officers Jon Stall and Ryan Jacobs described an incident following a triple shooting of Franklin Hill associates, resulting in two wounded and one killed. The retaliation was the murder of an unaffiliated man from Franklin Field. Officer Jacobs described the situation:

Two were wounded badly, one was killed. Later on that night a guy who lived out in Franklin Field walked out and smoked a cigarette in the morning and got shot like ten times not the least bit gang affiliated, nothing, but the feeling was the Hill had to do something, so what do you do, who do you blame? So they just said, 'Oh we're going through there,' and this poor guy got killed who had nothing to do with anything.

Officer Stall added:

There was a couple members of Franklin Hill who were shot. And of course the way these things go they assume it was someone from the other group who did it. So at three in morning an unfortunate fellow who was having some domestic stress decided to take a walk and have a cigarette and I guess anyone from Franklin Field will do, so he was killed. One of the really sad aspects of that was that there were probably about 15 shots fired, and no one called the police.

Officer Cameron Jackson was a dissenter of the belief that all homicides of gang associates receive retaliatory homicides. When asked to describe the reaction after an

associate of a gang is killed by a rival gang associate, he replied “Between the Hill and the Field, they really haven’t, there really hasn’t been any homicides related to that to say. There was back in ‘04 there was one and there was a lot of back and forth type of thing but, you know I’ve seen it more with other groups.”

In summary, the majority of individuals in all three interview population groups believe retaliation in the form of shootings and homicides occur after a gang associate is killed by a rival gang member. However, the current retaliatory shootings focus on shooting anyone from the rival neighborhood, whereas in the past the shootings were solely of rival gang members. One law enforcement officer explained he did not believe there to be frequent retaliatory homicides between these two rival gangs.

Individual Characteristics

In addition to the numerous accounts of retaliation, there were also more subtle, individual characteristics discussed by the individuals I interviewed that could contribute to the sustained violence over time.

Shame and Disrespect

Anderson’s (1998) theory of the code of the streets and Gilligan’s (1996) theory of shame and lack of self esteem being the root cause of all violence were very well supported by my interviews. Individuals from all three interview subject groups explained how retaliation for acts of disrespect stemmed from feelings of shame at being publicly humiliated.

When asked to describe the reaction of a gang associate to a physical beating, Officer Cameron Jackson, a member of the law enforcement population, replied, “Either me and my friends are gonna jump this dude, or I’m gonna go this time and do a mission

cause I'm embarrassed." Dave Lee, a youth worker in the area, explained homicides could be caused by an immediate response to intense feelings of shame:

[A fatal shooting could be caused by] major disrespect or someone feels humiliated, and that's more spur of the moment as opposed to, you know, cause once you're humiliated and when you calm down people will think twice but when you're caught up in the moment, it's more violent.

While describing how violence can escalate between gangs, Sean Collins explained, "Things escalate because no one wants to back down, they're too ashamed, that's why beefs continue." He continued to explain, "When beef gets bad, it escalates, but if I get punked, I'll eat that one. But if there's scars that can't be hidden, then things'll escalate. It's an emotional response." The "scars that can't be hidden" imply the individual who was assaulted feels ashamed and embarrassed about losing a fight, and therefore responds with violence, which supports the cultural theories in the existing literature. While describing the ongoing cycle of gang violence in the Franklin area, Charles Wells explained low self esteem is a common underlying cause:

Why has [the violent rivalry] gone on for so long? The external factors of the environment have created a negative perception. If you perceive your project is ghetto and rat infested, if you believe that, it will hurt one's self esteem.

When you hurt one's self esteem, the only way to feel better about yourself is to commit an act of violence in an attempt to gain back some self respect. When asked to describe what precedes a shooting between the rival gangs, Dave Lee replied, "if you trace it down, you're gonna find that somebody with low self esteem to begin with got disrespected." Darren Rosse even cited Gilligan's work as his underlying belief about what has sustained gang violence over time:

I credit [Gilligan] with almost all of these instances, when you begin to break them down, why a violent act occurred, particularly among youth, it

has to do with somebody who's been shamed, whose self esteem has been so lowered the only way they feel they can raise it or even come back to even is to do a violent act against somebody...I'm not saying it's gonna be everyone, there's still gonna be the local drug store robbery that may not come off quite that way, but it explains a lot in terms of violence when you put it that way. When you put it that way, one of the things I read of his earlier today was him talking about that in America a lot of your self esteem is based on economic wealth, you know your job or whatever, so when you lower that for a whole community, you get violence.

The former gang associates also described several instances in which feelings of shame at being physically assaulted caused their violent retaliations. Jamal Thompson described a situation in which he was publicly humiliated by being "sucker punched" at Chez Vous, and had to return and "take care of that" by beating the original offender with the help of Jamal's fellow gang associates. Justin Mitchell explained if you were ever beat up and ran away to escape, you were required to retaliate because the rest of the gang would be ashamed of you:

If there's a scuffle on the bus, at the store, you get beat up, then run away? The OGs will say you gotta go handle that.¹⁷ They might give you advice, but they won't physically go do it for you, that's your disgrace. The [OGs] will ask you, 'Who? You ran from those lames? Y'all better go handle it.'

The responses from my interviews suggest although retaliation plays a key role in sustaining the gang violence between the two rival groups, the retaliation stems from feelings of shame, disrespect, and a lack of self esteem. These feelings cause individuals to believe they have to retaliate in order to re-earn their respect and street credit, and they retaliate with violence. These findings support the cultural explanations of respect and street credit continuing gang violence.

¹⁷ Retaliate with violence.

Inability to Fight

An interesting theory was proposed by several of the individuals I spoke with that today's youth lack the ability to participate in a physical, weaponless fight. Individuals from each subject population explained how in the 1980s, disputes and acts of retaliation were settled first with physical fights or confrontations, whereas today the first instinct is to reach for a gun. Today's youth have become dependent on guns to replace their ability to fight. In order to prevent themselves from losing their street credit, they are forced to retaliate against nonviolent acts of disrespect with the only fighting tool they know how to use—guns.

Officer Julio Baconte explained how gang associates today are “wimpy people that won't fight, and they think the best way to handle [disrespect] is with a gun.” He went on to explain how one of his tools for trying to prevent gang violence is teaching youth to box. “By building their confidence in the ring, they'll be less likely to resort to guns on the street.”

Sean Collins, a local youth worker, explained a similar idea. He frequently takes youth to a local gym and teaches them to “punch the bag” to help target their aggression. He described the difference between the fighting ability of today's youth compared with youth in the 1980s:

Guys can't fight, they don't know how, so they use guns, they travel in packs. This is the difference between them and OGs—if you can use your hands, not be afraid to use knives, you've got money, and can supply guns and drugs, you're a triple threat. Lots of kids today don't know to defend themselves without a gun.

Anthony Berry, a former gang associate, frequently referred to current gang members as cowards, explaining, “They go get a gun when they have beef because they're cowards and don't wanna fight.” Andre Mills, another former gang associate,

expressed similar thoughts about today's gang members: "They're cowards, they can't fight. The young dudes now can't fight, so they're quick to get a gun. The access to guns is so easy, it's like going to the store to buy some penny candy."

This evidence suggests one of the factors contributing to sustained gang violence is the shift during the early 1990s in type of weapons and subsequent lack of fighting skill. Underlying the problem seems to be individuals feeling disrespected and believing they must retaliate for this disrespect, but instead of engaging in a fist fight, they immediately resort to guns because they lack fighting skills.

Number of Key Players in the Gangs

One of the major theories in the literature suggests the minority of individuals are responsible for the majority of the crime in an area (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972). In order to determine if the violence between these two neighborhoods has been sustained by a few individuals, I asked each interview subject how many people are responsible for the violence between these two gangs.

Every person I interviewed agreed between three and 10 individuals are the "key players" responsible for most the violence. Some individuals, such as youth worker Casey Donovan, consider people responsible for the violence if they "are willing to pull the trigger at any given time." Others, such as Officer Nicholas Matthews, considered these individuals the true "leaders" of the group, "the shot callers" who have great influence over the activities, including shootings, of the gangs. All of the people I interviewed also agreed if you removed these individuals from the streets, violent crime rates would go down. Officer Jon Stall explained this crime drop recently happened in Franklin Field: "We took off most of their key players, and now they're struggling."

Unfortunately, every individual also explained how numerous others are always willing and eager to step up and fill the vacant leadership roles. Jamal Thompson explained he became a leader in his gang because his friend and mentor was arrested and incarcerated, and he was selected to carry on his “brother’s responsibilities.”

However, most of the individuals I interviewed also explained the leadership hierarchy in these gangs today is much less than it was during the 1980s. Charles Wells, a local youth worker, described the leadership of the gangs today as more of a “camaraderie” and “loose association.” Youth worker Darren Rosse explained, “Back in my time people just ran their [gangs and drug dealing] better.” Jamal also explained how even though there are a few clear cut leaders, more of the followers try to use violence to gain their own reputation and leadership style, leading to increased numbers of people committing shootings and other violent acts. He explained, “Today everyone wants to be a chief, there’s no Indians. The mindset is get a gun, shoot, ask questions later.” This mentality differs in stark contrast to the gang hierarchy in the 1980s, in which there were clear leaders and everyone worked together to protect the gang. The shift from one type of leadership style to the other seemed to occur during the early 1990s when many of the OGs began disappearing, whether they were arrested and incarcerated or killed. Young gang associates were left to step up and fill the ranks of the gangs, but this led to less structured gangs. Justin Mitchell described the shift in gang leadership when many of the OGs started to disappear:

[Now that the OGs started getting locked up] you have 21 year olds as the head of a clique, a faction clique. At 22, you’ve put in no work, but you’re an OG?! You can tell the way guys carry themselves, you have these young kids who do stupid things, there’s no leadership. And you have an idiot in charge of knuckleheads causing more trouble and chaos.

The responses in my interviews seem to suggest that although there is a core group of individuals responsible for leading each gang, other individuals are willing to commit the shootings and other violent crimes. Individuals are also willing to step up and fill the shoes of leaders after they disappear, suggesting that, although a minority of the people involved in the gangs may be responsible for the violence at any one given time, there are numerous other people who would be willing to take on that role as violent offenders. These responses also suggest the disappearance of a crucial generation of gang leaders led to much less structured, informal gangs in this area. This shift could have contributed to the shift in types of violence being used by the youth in these gangs.

Conclusion

After analyzing the 20 interviews I conducted, I reached several conclusions about what has sustained the violent rivalry between these two gangs. It appears these gangs were founded as drug gangs in the 1980s, using violence only for business-related matters. These matters could include acts of retaliatory violence if an associate from one gang was severely beaten, disrespected, shot, or killed. However, the acts of retaliation began with physical fights and only escalated to shootings to retaliate for stabbings or shootings against members in their own gang.

In the early to mid-1990s, violent incidents seemed to shift to being motivated by interpersonal disputes instead of drug-related business problems. Fueled by feelings of shame and a lack of self esteem, individuals responded with violence when they were disrespected by associates of rival gangs. As OGs began being arrested or killed and removed from the gang communities, younger individuals were forced to step up and take over the gangs. These factors led to an extremely young group of individuals being

involved in the gang life without considerable amounts of older leadership. Without the guidance of the OGs, the younger gang members began using extreme measures of violence to settle acts of disrespect. While gang associates would fight without weapons to settle beefs in the 1980s, gang associates in the 1990s and 2000s began using guns. The gang associates in the 1990s and early 2000s lost the ability to fight using their hands, and became solely dependent on guns to settle disputes with violence. By the mid-1990s, when an individual was disrespected in a nonviolent way it became the norm to respond with violence, and the only violence these youth were able to successfully use involved guns. According to my interviews, this unfortunate combination of factors has led to the sustained violence between these two gangs. I will further analyze this theory by combining my interview results with the results of my quantitative data analysis on retaliation in the “Discussion and Conclusion” chapter of my thesis.

Chapter 6: Quantitative Retaliation Results

By far the most commonly cited reason for sustained gang violence across the different interview population samples I interviewed was retaliation. In order to more empirically examine trends of retaliation between the gangs in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, I constructed and analyzed two datasets from BPD data about shootings in this local area. The goal of analyzing these datasets was to determine what role, if any, retaliation has in this violent gang rivalry, and what type of retaliation (i.e. reflexive or deferred) is most commonly used.

Geographical Data Analysis

Overview

As stated in the “Methodology” chapter of my thesis, I used a geographically-based dataset of shootings and shooting homicides in known Franklin Field and Franklin Hill gang territories between 2004 and 2009 to analyze the effects and type of retaliation occurring between the FFB and FHG. As stated earlier, reflexive retaliation will be defined as a shooting in one gang territory following a shooting in the rival gang territory during the same month. Short-term deferred retaliation will be defined as a shooting in one gang territory following a shooting in the rival gang territory in the previous month, and long-term deferred retaliation will be defined as a shooting in one gang territory following a shooting in the rival gang territory in the previous two or three months.

I created a descriptive statistical table in order to better examine the shooting trends in the geographical areas. This table is presented below as Table 6.1, and is represented visually as Figure 6.1.


Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, 2004-2009

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Franklin Hill							
Nonlethal Shootings	0	4	6	5	4	3	22
Shooting Homicides	0	0	1	3	0	0	4
Franklin Field							
Nonlethal Shootings	0	5	0	3	1	4	13
Shooting Homicides	0	0	1	1	2	0	4
Total	0	9	8	12	7	7	43

As evidenced by the data in Table 6.1, the most shootings have occurred in the Franklin Hill Area. Both Franklin Hill and Franklin Field have had an identical number, four, of shooting homicides over the past six years. However, Franklin Hill had nine more nonlethal shootings during this six year span than Franklin Field, with the largest disparity occurring between 2006 and 2008. It is important to note more shootings in one area do not necessarily imply more shootings of gang associates from that area. For example, although there were four nonlethal shootings in Franklin Hill in 2008, it is possible two of those shootings were of individuals associated with Franklin Hill, while the other two shootings were of individuals from Franklin Field who happened to be in Franklin Hill. According to my interviews and person-based data analysis, the majority of the shootings appear to be offensive, in which an individual from one gang enters rival gang territory and shoots someone in that neighborhood. Unfortunately, these data are not specific enough to definitively prove this, but they are helpful in analyzing if there is an effect on the number of shootings in each neighborhood based on the location of prior shootings.


If there is significant reflexive retaliation occurring between these two geographical areas, there will be a similar number of shootings in each location during the same month because a shooting in one location would merit an immediate shooting in

Figure 6.1: All Shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field Areas, 2004-2009



the opposing gang's territory. If there is significant deferred retaliation occurring between these two geographical areas, the pattern of shootings will be much more stretched out, with shootings in one location followed by shootings in the opposing neighborhood several months apart. By examining the monthly shooting trends depicted in Figure 6.2 below, the data suggests there is significant retaliation between the two neighborhoods, and the retaliation is deferred. There are no simultaneous spikes in the number of shootings in each neighborhood during the same month, suggesting reflexive retaliation is not occurring between these neighborhoods. There are examples of both short- and long-term deferred retaliation, with short-term retaliation occurring within one month of the initial shooting (e.g. May to July 2009), and long-term retaliation occurring within several months of the initial shooting (e.g. July to December 2007).

Figure 6.2: Monthly Shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, 2004-2009



Reflexive and Short-Term Deferred Retaliation

In order to examine the retaliatory nature of these shootings statistically, I conducted several regression analyses on the data. My first regression analysis focused on determining whether shooting retaliations between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are reflexive retaliations or short-term deferred retaliations. To answer this question, I conducted multiple regression analyses, focusing on the effects of shootings in one neighborhood based on shootings in the opposing neighborhood over short periods of time. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 6.2.

In Model 1, I examined the effect of all shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) and month (t – 1) on all shootings in Franklin Field in month (t). For example, this model examined the effect of all shootings in January and February 2007 in Franklin Hill on the number of shootings in Franklin Field in February 2007. The analysis showed there was

not a significant effect, implying reflexive and short-term deferred retaliation did not occur at a significant level using these variables.

Table 6.2. Regression Analysis of Shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, 2004-2009

	Franklin Field			Franklin Hill		
	All Shootings	All Shootings	Homicide	All Shootings	All Shootings	Homicide
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All in Hill (t)	.020 (.220)	.020 (.022)	.108*** (2.760)			
All in Hill (t – 1)	.085 (.920)	.084 (.091)	.012 (.290)		.042 (.350)	
All in Field (t)				.041 (.260)	.035 (.220)	-.050 (-.750)
All in Field (t – 1)		.004 (.030)		.007 (.050)	.005 (.030)	-.049 (-.720)
ABDW in Field (t)						
ABDW in Hill (t)						
Homicide in Field (t)						
Homicide in Hill (t)						
Intercept	.201** (2.590)	.200** (2.430)	.012 (.033)	.355*** (.260)	.341** (3.240)	.079* (1.950)
R-squared	.013	.013	.103	.001	.003	.016
N	72	72	72	72	72	72

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t values, *Significant at the $p < .1$ level, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

In Model 2, I conducted a similar analysis to Model 1, but added the independent variable of shootings at month (t – 1) in Franklin Field. This analysis allowed me to examine what, if any, effect shootings in the preceding month has on shootings in the current month in one neighborhood, taking into account the shootings in those two months in the opposing neighborhood, Franklin Hill. It is logical that if a shooting occurred in Franklin Field last month and members of Franklin Field retaliated against

Franklin Hill, Franklin Hill would shoot at Franklin Field again in the current month. However, this regression suggests shootings in Franklin Field in the previous month do not have a significant effect on shootings in the subsequent month, implying this theory of retaliation is not true.

In Model 3, I conducted an analysis to determine if shooting homicides in Franklin Field at month (t) are affected by the number of shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) or (t – 1). Interestingly, this regression yielded extremely significant results, suggesting homicides in Franklin Field in month (t) are significantly affected by the number of shootings (homicides and ABDW) in Franklin Hill. This finding suggests there is reflexive retaliation in the form of shooting homicides by associates of the Franklin Hill Giants following shootings in Franklin Hill. After discovering these results, I ran another regression, Model 7, to determine whether shooting homicides or ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill had a more significant effect on the number of shooting homicides in Franklin Field. This analysis is shown in Table 6.3. The results suggest ABDW shootings in month (t) in Franklin Hill are the only variable to have a significant effect on the number of shooting homicides in Franklin Field in month (t). These data suggest gang associates from Franklin Hill are likely to reflexively retaliate against ABDW shootings with homicides.

In Model 4, I examined the effect of all shootings in Franklin Field at month (t) and month (t – 1) on all shootings in Franklin Hill in month (t). Similar to the results using Franklin Field as the dependent variable, the analysis showed there was not a significant effect, implying retaliation did not occur at a significant level using these variables.

Table 6.3. Regression Analysis of Homicides in Franklin Field, 2004-2009

Franklin Field	
	Homicide (7)
ABDW in Hill (t)	.149*** (3.390)
ABDW in Hill (t – 1)	.028 (.640)
Homicide in Hill (t)	-.068 (-.730)
Homicide in Hill (t – 1)	-.013 (-.140)
Intercept	.006 (.180)
R-squared	.159
N	72

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t values, *Significant at the $p < .1$ level, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

In Model 5, I again conducted a similar analysis to Model 1, but added the independent variable of shootings at month (t – 1) in Franklin Hill. As stated earlier, this analysis allowed me to examine what, if any, effect shootings in the preceding month has on shootings in the current month in one neighborhood, taking into account the shootings in those two months in the opposing neighborhood, Franklin Field. However, this regression suggests shootings in Franklin Hill in the previous month do not have a significant effect on shootings in the subsequent month, implying this theory of retaliation is not true.

In Model 6, I conducted an analysis to determine if shooting homicides in Franklin Hill at month (t) are affected by the number of shootings in Franklin Field in month (t) or (t – 1). This regression was asymmetric to Model 3, showing homicides in Franklin Hill are not significantly affected by the number of shootings in Franklin Field

in the current or previous month. This finding suggests gang associates in Franklin Field do not retaliate as seriously or as regularly as gang associates from Franklin Hill.

In addition to analyzing these regressions, I also analyzed each type of shooting (ABDW and homicide) in one geographical area with the same type of shooting in the counterpart location at time (t) and time (t – 1). For example, I analyzed the effect of ABDW shootings in Franklin Field on ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill during time (t) and time (t – 1). All of these regressions yielded insignificant results, suggesting shootings of one type in month (t) or (t – 1) do not have a significant effect on shootings of the same type in the opposite neighborhood. Due to the insignificant results of these regressions, the results are not depicted in Table 6.2.

In summary, only ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill in month (t) significantly affect the number of shooting homicides in Franklin Field in month (t), while all other shooting relationships are statistically insignificant. These data suggest reflexive retaliation only occurs between ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill and shooting homicides in Franklin Field, while short-term deferred retaliation does not occur.

Long-Term Deferred Retaliation

In order to test whether long-term deferred retaliation occurs between the FFB and FHG, I conducted multiple regressions using longer lag variables. In addition to determining if shootings in one neighborhood at month (t) and (t – 1) affected shootings in the rival neighborhood at month (t), I expanded the time length to include months (t – 2) and (t – 3). As suggested earlier in the literature, some instances of retaliation occur on a long-term deferred basis due to numerous situational factors (e.g. Wright and Jacobs

2006). By analyzing longer time length trends, I can determine if long-term deferred retaliation is used by the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field gangs.

I conducted analyses of each type of shooting (i.e. all shootings, ABDW shootings, and homicide shootings) in one neighborhood with each type of shooting in the rival neighborhood at time months (t) , $(t - 1)$, $(t - 2)$, and $(t - 3)$ in order to provide a lengthy enough time lag for long-term deferred retaliation. The significant results of the analysis are depicted below in Table 6.4.

Of all possible regressions using Franklin Field shootings as the dependent variable, only homicides in Franklin Field were significantly associated with all shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) and, more significantly, ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) . All other regressions yielded insignificant results, suggesting only ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) are significantly associated with homicides in Franklin Field at month (t) .

Of all possible regressions using Franklin Hill shootings as the dependent variable, several lagged shooting types in Franklin Field yielded significant effects. As shown in Model 3, all shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) were significantly affected by all shootings in Franklin Field at month $(t - 3)$. Model 4 shows ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) were significantly affected by all shootings in Franklin Field at month $(t - 3)$. These two models suggest FFB associates retaliate against all shootings, particularly ABDW shootings, three months after the initial shooting with an ABDW shooting in FHG territory.

Table 6.4: Regression Analysis of Deferred Retaliation Shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, 2004-2009

	Franklin Field	Franklin Hill				
	Homicide Shootings (1)	Homicide Shootings (2)	All Shootings (3)	ABDW Shootings (4)	Homicide Shootings (5)	Homicide Shootings (6)
All in Hill (t)	.102** (2.510)					
All in Field (t)			.056 (.350)	.099 (.700)	-.043 (-.660)	
All in Hill (t - 1)	.007 (.160)					
All in Field (t - 1)			-.011 (-.070)	.037 (.260)	-.048 (-.720)	
All in Hill (t - 2)	.035 (.850)					
All in Field (t - 2)			.181 (1.110)	.009 (.060)	.172** (2.540)	
All in Hill (t - 3)	.038 (.920)					
All in Field (t - 3)			-.325* (-1.990)	-.280* (-1.930)	-.045 (-.0670)	
ABDW in Hill (t)		.147*** (3.290)				
ABDW in Hill (t - 1)		.027 (.600)				
ABDW in Hill (t - 2)		.038 (.045)				
ABDW in Hill (t - 3)		.058 (1.310)				
Homicide in Field (t)						-.038 (-.270)
Homicide in Field (t - 1)						-.038 (-.270)
Homicide in Field (t - 2)						.461*** (3.180)
Homicide in Field (t - 3)						-.038 (-.270)
Intercept	-.010 (2.51)	-.028 (-.730)	.403 (3.590)	.350 (3.510)	.053 (1.140)	.038 (.990)
R-squared	.123	.183	.078	.062	.115	.146
N	72	72	72	72	72	72

Note: Numbers in parentheses are t values, *Significant at the p<.1 level, **p<.05, ***p<.01

As shown in Model 5, homicide shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) were significantly affected by all shootings in Franklin Field at month (t – 2). Finally, Model 6 shows homicide shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) were significantly affected by homicides in Franklin Field at month (t – 2). These two models suggest Franklin Field associates retaliate against all shootings, particularly homicides, two months after the initial shooting with a shooting homicide in FHG territory.

All of these regressions suggest long-term deferred retaliation shootings of two and three months are more common between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field than reflexive retaliation shootings.

Person-Based Data Analysis

My second analysis used person-based data about shootings between known FHG and FFB gang associates between January 2006 and September 2009. I used these data to determine the type of retaliation between FFB and FHG associates. As stated earlier, reflexive retaliation will be defined as a shooting of one gang associate following a shooting of a rival gang associate within two weeks of the initial shooting. Deferred retaliation includes two different time frames, and will be defined as a shooting of one gang associate following a shooting of a rival gang associate within the past 30 days and 60 days.

The results of my analysis are shown in Table 6.5.

14-Day Reflexive Retaliation

After careful analysis, only five of the 17 shootings appeared to be reflexive retaliation. The first retaliatory set of shootings, occurring on May 21 and May 30 of 2006, happened within two weeks of each other and involved nonlethal shootings of a

Table 6.5: Person-Based Shooting Retaliation between Franklin Hill Giants and Franklin Field Boyz, January 2006-September 2009

Date of Shooting	Gang Area Where Shooting Occurred	Type of Shooting	Victim Gang Affiliation	Suspected Suspect Gang Affiliation	Reflexive Retaliatory Shooting	30-Day Deferred Retaliation	60-Day Deferred Retaliation
4/20/2006	N/A	ABDW	Franklin Hill	Franklin Field			X1
5/1/2006	Franklin Hill	ABDW*	Franklin Hill*			X1	X1
5/1/2006	Franklin Hill	ABDW*	Franklin Hill*			X1	X1
5/1/2006	Franklin Hill	ABDW*	Franklin Hill			X1	X1
5/21/2006	N/A	ABDW	Franklin Hill; Greenwood*	Greenwood	X1	X1	X1
5/30/2006	Franklin Hill	ABDW	Franklin Field*; MOB*	Franklin Hill	X1*	X1*	X1*
2/28/2007	N/A	ABDW*		Franklin Hill; Wood Ave			X2
2/28/2007	N/A	ABDW*		Franklin Hill; Wood Ave		X2	X2
3/28/2007	Franklin Field	ABDW	Franklin Field	Franklin Hill	X2	X2	X2
3/29/2007	Franklin Hill	Homicide		Franklin Field; MOB	X2*	X2*	X2*
4/2/2007	Franklin Hill	ABDW	Franklin Hill*	Franklin Field	X2*	X2*	X2*
4/23/2007	N/A	ABDW		Franklin Hill			X2*
5/16/2007	Franklin Field	Homicide*	Franklin Field*	Franklin Hill			X2*
5/16/2007	Franklin Field	ABDW*	Franklin Field*	Franklin Hill			X2*
10/18/2007	N/A	Homicide	Franklin Field				
1/18/2008	Franklin Field	Homicide	Franklin Field*	Franklin Hill			
12/10/2008	Franklin Hill	ABDW	Franklin Hill	Franklin Field			
	N/A = neutral location	* = "double shooting"	* = "suspected gang affiliation"		* = actual retaliatory shooting		

Note: X1 = first complete set of retaliation, X2 = second complete set of retaliation. All shootings considered motivation for retaliation are included in dataset, shootings which can be classified as actual retaliation (i.e. not initial precipitating event of episode) are denoted *.

gang associate from Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, respectively. However, the second shooting may not actually be reflexive retaliation for the first. It is important to note the initial Franklin Hill shooting is suspected of being an internal dispute, with a member of the Franklin Hill Giants or Greenwood, one of Franklin Hill's known allies, committing the shooting. If associates of the Franklin Hill gang were unaware of the internal dispute and assumed the shooting was committed by associates of Franklin Field, the shooting on May 30 would be considered retaliatory. As was explained in my interviews, there is frequently misinformation spread about shootings, particularly who the offenders are, and there are occasionally times when only certain members of a gang know all the details of a crime. If one of these factors was true for this case, it would be logical for gang associates of Franklin Hill to retaliate against Franklin Field. However, it is possible the two shootings are unrelated if all associates of Franklin Hill were aware of the internal dispute, in which case the two shootings being so close together in time could be a coincidence.

The second incident of reflexive retaliation involves three shootings, one each on March 28, March 29, and April 2 of 2007. All three shootings were classified by the police as being part of the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field feud. The initial shooting was a nonfatal shooting of a known Franklin Field associate by a known Franklin Hill associate. The following day, a Franklin Field associate shot and killed an individual with no known gang affiliation. Police considered this shooting to be related to the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field rivalry, and it is possible associates from Franklin Field, wanting to retaliate, shot the first individual from Franklin Hill they could find. The location of the shooting was Sun Pizza, a local pizza shop notorious for being part of Franklin Hill's

gang territory. It is likely associates from Franklin Field knew a shooting at Sun Pizza would be considered an attack against Franklin Hill, making this a retaliatory shooting for the March 28 incident. Four days later, a known associate from Franklin Field shot and nonfatally wounded a known associate from Franklin Hill. It is possible the shooting at Sun Pizza, although considered a Franklin Hill “hang out,” did not suffice since a known associate of Franklin Hill was not wounded. The April 2 shooting was of a known Franklin Hill associate, which could be considered a successful (i.e. hit a known associate of the rival gang) act of retaliation. These three shootings appear to be a clear example of reflexive retaliation shootings.

30-Day Deferred Retaliation

The 30-day deferred retaliation analysis yielded nine retaliatory shootings. As in the reflexive retaliation analysis, there were two distinct episodes of retaliation, denoted as X1 and X2. The first episode contained five shootings, two of which were part of the reflexive retaliation analysis. By extending the time frame to the past 30 days, the triple shooting on May 1, 2006 was also included. The data suggest the triple shooting on May 1 and shooting on May 21, 2006 of known Franklin Hill associates sparked retaliation against a known Franklin Field associate on May 30, 2006. Although only the final, fifth shooting was an actual incident that can be classified as a retaliatory shooting, the four shootings prior to it were part of the episode because they triggered the retaliatory response.

The second episode of retaliation in the 30-day deferred retaliation analysis includes four shootings, three of which were included in the reflexive retaliation analysis. In addition to those three shootings, the 30-day analysis includes an ABDW shooting on

February 28, 2007 as the initial precipitating event that sparked the episode of retaliation. Two of the four shootings in the second episode can be considered actual retaliations, with the initial two shootings being the precipitating factors. The 30-day deferred retaliation analysis suggests deferred retaliation occurs more frequently than reflexive retaliation because nine of the 17 shootings are now considered part of retaliation episodes instead of five in the reflexive retaliation.

60-Day Deferred Retaliation

The 60-day deferred retaliation analysis yielded 14 shootings as retaliatory. Again, there are two distinct episodes of retaliation, denoted as X1 and X2. The first episode contains six shootings. It includes the five shootings discussed in the 30-day deferred retaliation section, and also extends far enough back to include the first shooting in the dataset on April 20, 2006. This initial shooting was committed by a known Franklin Field associate against a known Franklin Hill associate, and was described by the police as a possible drug dispute. This shooting was followed less than two weeks later by a triple shooting of Franklin Hill associates, which is not considered retaliatory because all of the shootings had Franklin Hill associates as the victim. The fifth shooting in the series was again against Franklin Hill, but the sixth and final shooting was the definitive retaliation, with a known Franklin Hill associate shooting a known Franklin Field associate. Although technically only one of the shootings can be classified as retaliatory, the five shootings leading up to it are necessary factors that likely precipitated the retaliation.

The second episode of deferred retaliation contains eight shootings. Three of the shootings were analyzed in the reflexive retaliation section, as well as a fourth related to

those in the 30-day deferred retaliation section. By including all shootings within the 60 days prior to the retaliatory shooting, this episode now includes two more shootings prior to and following the core retaliations described in earlier analyses. The initial first two shootings were a double shooting by known Franklin Hill associates against individuals with unknown gang affiliations. However, the police believed the motivation for these shootings stemmed from the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field gang feud. These shootings were followed by another shooting of a known Franklin Field associate by a known Franklin Hill associate on March 28, 2007. These three shootings were followed by the first definitive retaliatory shooting in the series on March 29, a homicide at a known Franklin Hill hang out by a known associate of Franklin Field. This shooting was followed several days later by another shooting by Franklin Field of a known Franklin Hill associate. As described earlier, this is likely part of the retaliation, ensuring a known associate of Franklin Hill was shot because the shooting at Sun Pizza, although considered part of Franklin Hill's turf, might not have hit a Franklin Hill associate. These shootings were followed by three retaliatory shootings conducted by known Franklin Hill associates. The first shooting on April 23, 2007, hit an individual with an unknown gang affiliation. However, there was a double shooting on May 16, 2007, in which known Franklin Hill associates shot two known Franklin Field associates, killing one and wounding the other. These shootings appear to have paused the shootings between the two gangs for several months. There were no further shootings that we know of between these two groups until October 2007.

By including all shootings within the 60 days prior to a retaliatory shooting, I am able to include the majority of all shootings in the dataset. It appears to give a much more

complete story of the continuity between these gang-related shootings. However, it is possible these shootings are actually not related by retaliation as this data would make it seem. It could be a coincidence that two shootings occur within several days of each other against rival gangs. One shooting could be retaliation for a nonviolent act of disrespect, such as stepping on someone's shoes, while another shooting two days later could be caused by a completely different motivation, such as an individual being caught on rival gang turf. Unfortunately, without interviewing the shooters of each of these crimes, it will be extremely difficult to determine exactly why each of these shootings occurred and if they are related to one another. However, these data do provide evidence for the theory that retaliation is occurring between these two gangs, but at an extremely slow and lengthy rate. The most common form of retaliation appears to be long-term deferred retaliation, implying quick, reflexive retaliation is actually rather rare between these two gangs. Further analysis of what could cause these delays in retaliation will be explored in greater detail in the conclusion of my thesis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the data in these two datasets suggest reflexive, short-term retaliation is extremely uncommon. Only five of 17 shootings in the person-based dataset qualified as retaliation episodes, with only two of the five being actual retaliation shootings (i.e. not the precipitating shootings leading up to the retaliation). My analysis of the 30-day deferred retaliation showed slightly less than half of the shootings can be considered part of retaliation episodes, with only four of those shootings being actual retaliation shootings. This analysis suggests short-term, immediate retaliation is also somewhat rare. The geographical-based data also supports this conclusion, with shootings

in one neighborhood having no significant effect on shootings in the opposing neighborhood based on shootings in the same or previous month. According to my geographical dataset, ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill have a significant effect on shooting homicides in Franklin Field, and are the only relationship of shootings to have a significant reflexive relationship. These analyses suggest reflexive and short-term shooting retaliations are very rare between these two rival gangs.

The geographical dataset suggests long-term deferred retaliation shootings do play a significant role in continuing the gang violence, with shootings two and three months ago having a significant effect on current shootings. Similarly, the 60-day person-based deferred retaliation analysis suggests the majority of shootings can be considered part of a retaliatory episode. In conclusion, these quantitative data suggest long-term deferred retaliatory shootings play the most significant role in sustaining the FFB and FHG violent gang rivalry over time.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Discussion

The qualitative and quantitative analyses conducted in my thesis have helped answer the broad question of what has sustained the gang violence between the Franklin Hill Giants and Franklin Field Boyz. In order to understand the continuity of violence between these rival gangs, I focused on answering three questions: (1) what caused the initial violent gang rivalry to begin?; (2) what has continued to cause the violence between these two gangs?; and (3) what is the effect of retaliation in this violent gang rivalry? Based on national and Boston-specific research, my thesis has tested several theories of the causes of sustained gang violence using interviews with key subjects and quantitative analyses of shooting data from the Boston Police Department. Within the scope of my methodology and data, my analyses of the conflict between the FFB and FHG support these macro-level theories and reveal that deferred retaliation is most frequently used between the FFB and FHG.

Research on the origins of violent gang rivalries both nationally and in Boston suggests youth violence began in the mid-1980s in response to the emergence of widespread crack cocaine markets (e.g. Blumstein 1995, Cook and Laub 1998, Braga 2003). The majority of the law enforcement officers, youth workers, and former gang associates and longtime community members I interviewed from the Franklin area confirmed these preexisting theories at the micro-level. My interview respondents explained how these two gangs emerged to help regulate the illicit drug business, particularly crack cocaine, during the late 1980s. Violence was used to control the business markets in the area and eliminate competition. Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are located directly across the street from one another, making it extremely likely there would be drug territory disputes between the two neighborhoods. The developments are

divided by Blue Hill Avenue, a street notorious for widespread availability of drugs for residents of inner city Boston, as well as the suburbs. Blue Hill Avenue is easily accessible to the greater Boston area, making it an extremely lucrative location for drug sales. Due to the illegal nature of their drug business, the FFB and FHG were forced to use violence to protect their territory because they could not seek help from local law enforcement personnel. The majority of the interview responses suggest the crack cocaine markets sparked the increase in youth violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field during the 1980s.

Other theories were suggested by my interview subjects about the start of the violent gang rivalry, with the second most common explanation being a specific violent incident sparking a retaliatory war between associates from the rival gangs. The nature of the stories varied, from fights over girls and food to homicides of fellow gang associates; however, there was no agreed upon specific incident that started this gang rivalry. Other, less frequently cited theories of the origin of this gang rivalry included the Crips and Bloods recruiting and taking over parts of Franklin, structural theories such as the dilapidated nature of the housing developments and lack of neighborhood resources, and unknown causes of the gang rivalry. Although these theories were less supported, it is possible the drug markets that were widely cited as being the cause of the gang violence were only a part of the rivalry. It also is possible there was a specific violent incident between the two neighborhoods, perhaps related to the drug trade, that resulted in individuals from each neighborhood becoming involved in retaliatory violence. Although the exact details of this incident are unknown, it has important implications for understanding the continuity of gang violence. As many of the individuals I interviewed

explained, most people are not sure why the violent gang rivalry exists, but they are still part of it. It is a rivalry that appears to be so ingrained in the culture of the two neighborhoods that, despite not understanding how it began, individuals are willing to participate in violence because of the collective group identity of the gangs.

The second key research question I examined was what has continued the violence between these rival gangs since they originated in the 1980s. The existing literature suggests cultural explanations account for continued gang violence since the emergence and stabilization of the crack cocaine markets (e.g. Anderson 1998, Fagan and Wilkinson 1998, Gilligan 1996). Daily rituals of respect and status, similar to Anderson's "code of the street," are suggested to sustain the current violence (1998). Individuals who have been disrespected (e.g. looked at too long, bumped into on the street) must regain their street credit and respect, and do so with violence.

I spoke with my interview respondents about the continual nature of the gang violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and specifically about retaliation for different incidents. My interview respondents explained issues of nonviolent disrespect, such as hitting on someone's girlfriend or walking through rival gang territory, have to be met with violence. However, the type of violence used to retaliate against these nonviolent incidents of disrespect has varied over time. During the 1980s there were unspoken rules about committing acts of violence, including targeting only the specific individuals who wronged you and not shooting an individual when he was with his family to avoid collateral damage. Issues of disrespect were settled immediately, most often with a "fair one," a weaponless fight. During the early 1990s, the rules began to change as gang violence became more lethal and focused on interpersonal disputes and

revenge instead of drug- and business-related incidents. The OGs began to be arrested or killed, leaving younger gang associates to step up and fill the leadership positions of these two gangs. During this time there was a significant change in the types of violence, shifting from fights with one's fists to fights with knives and guns. As guns became more available and fighting ability became a less valued skill, guns became the norm for violence.

As was described in the interviews, gang associates feel ashamed when they are disrespected in public and, in accordance with the cultural explanations of Anderson (1998) and Gilligan (1996), the only way to regain their self esteem and street credit is to commit an act of violence against the offending individual. Although issues of disrespect were settled in a one-on-one setting without weapons during the 1980s, gang associates in the 1990s and 2000s did not learn how to fight with their fists, and instead turned to the easiest form of violence they knew how to effectively use—guns. Therefore, shootings became much more prevalent retaliatory responses to acts of nonviolent disrespect.

The responses from my interviews confirm the preexisting theories of cultural factors motivating continued gang violence at the micro-level. The implications of these results are that our preventive and intervention efforts at stopping youth gang violence need to be focused more on conflict mediation and building youth's self esteem, not on arresting drug dealers. Although illicit drug sales once had a key role in this violent gang rivalry, it no longer causes the majority of the gang violence in the area. By having a better understanding of the nature of the ongoing conflict between the rival gangs, which my analysis has provided, we can create and use more targeted, problem-oriented

interventions to help deter youth gang violence. My recommendations for solutions will be suggested later in this conclusion.

The final research question I hoped to answer was determining which, if any, theories of retaliation apply at the micro-level to the violence between the gangs in the Franklin area. The preexisting literature suggests individuals must retaliate for violence against their respective groups, and must do so as quickly as possible (Gould 2003, Jacobs and Wright 2006). However, there are often situational factors, such as increased police presence or an inability to find the offender, that result in deferred retaliation. In order to determine which type of retaliation is occurring at the micro-level between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, I conducted quantitative analyses using two datasets. The results of the first, geographically-based dataset suggested shooting retaliations between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field are long-term deferred retaliations of two or three months. Immediate, reflexive retaliations were rare events, with ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) having a significant effect on homicides in Franklin Field at month (t) being the only statistically significant reflexive retaliation. Further analyses suggested deferred retaliation is more common, with all shootings in Franklin Hill and ABDW shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) being significantly affected by the number of shootings in Franklin Field at month (t - 3). Homicide shootings in Franklin Hill at month (t) were significantly affected by the number of total shootings and homicides in Franklin Field at month (t - 2). These results suggest shootings in Franklin Hill are long-term deferred retaliation for shootings in Franklin Field two and three months prior to the retaliatory shooting. In summary, all of these data suggest FHG associates uses reflexive

retaliation more consistently than FFB associates, while FFB associates use long-term deferred retaliation more consistently than FHG associates.

My second quantitative analysis about retaliation focused on known gang-related shootings. This analysis again suggested reflexive retaliatory shootings were quite rare, with only five of 17 shootings in a four year period meeting the criteria. Deferred retaliation was much more common, with nine shootings being considered part of 30-day deferred retaliation shootings and 14 shootings considered part of 60-day deferred retaliation shootings. Although all of the shootings just described were part of the retaliation episodes, only three of the shootings were actual retaliation in both the reflexive retaliation analysis and 30-day deferred retaliation analysis. The remaining shootings considered part of the retaliation were the initial shootings that sparked the retaliation. However, six of the shootings in the 60-day deferred retaliation were actual retaliatory shootings, double that in each of the other forms of retaliation. These results, in combination with my earlier geographically-based results, suggest long-term deferred retaliation is the most common form of shooting retaliation between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

Taken together, my different quantitative and qualitative data suggest that violent retaliation is occurring between the FHG and FFB, but at a slow rate, often over long periods of time. These results have important implications for intervention efforts in the neighborhoods to attempt to stop the ongoing gang violence. One of the most important things for law enforcement and youth workers to do following a shooting between rival gangs is anticipate if there will be retaliatory shootings, and, if so, where and when the retaliation is going to occur. My analyses suggest shooting retaliation rarely occurs

reflexively between these two gangs. The use of deferred retaliation could be due to any one of the situational factors described earlier. However, the deferred retaliation suggests there is a significant window of time in which to intervene and potentially stop the retaliation from occurring between the two gangs. Since retaliation is occurring between these two neighborhoods at an extremely slow, stable rate, violence prevention efforts need to be increased not only immediately following a shooting, but continuously for at least three months afterwards. Many resources currently are deployed to these neighborhoods now following shootings. However, after several weeks, the resources subside, most likely due to being needed in other neighborhoods in Boston. The removal of these resources means there are more opportunities for shooting retaliations. By increasing law enforcement and community resources for longer periods of time following shootings in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, we may be able to prolong the length of time between retaliatory shootings and hopefully eventually stop it. If there is a longer span of time between opportunities for retaliatory shootings, it is possible individuals from each neighborhood will no longer desire revenge, or the police will have enough time to arrest and incarcerate the offender peacefully.

In summary, the research and analyses in my thesis confirm general and Boston-specific theories of the origins and continued nature of gang violence at the micro-level between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. The violent rivalry between the gangs in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field began as a way to regulate and compete in the crack cocaine markets in the late 1980s. During the early 1990s, cultural motivations for gang violence became much more prevalent, with issues of disrespect being settled with guns instead of fists or knives. The shooting retaliations between Franklin Hill and Franklin

Field in recent years appear to be deferred by several months, suggesting a need for increased long-term law enforcement and youth services in each neighborhood following shootings. The violent gang rivalry has now become so ingrained in the identity and culture of each neighborhood that youth who are unaware of how or why the violence began participate in it. The combination of all of these factors has led to the sustained gang violence between the Franklin Field Boyz and Franklin Hill Giants.

By understanding what has continued this gang violence at the micro-level over the past few decades, we are able to make much better informed recommendations about how to decrease and hopefully end the violence between these youth. This research has shown there is a great need for activities that build youth's self esteem in public housing developments. The root cause of violence today seems to be feelings of shame at being publicly disrespected and humiliated. By teaching today's youth how to improve their self esteem without violence, we can help decrease and hopefully one day stop the violence between rival gangs. This research also suggests today's youth need to learn other ways to channel their anger and revenge than guns. Several of the individuals I interviewed described significant benefits in youth, such as increased self esteem and decreased participation in shooting violence, when they learned how to box.

Unfortunately, the only programs for this are located in other neighborhoods of Boston, not in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. Creating a boxing program for youth from both developments could teach youth from each neighborhood to fight with respect, dignity, and no weapons, which could lead to decreased shootings between the neighborhoods. It is difficult to argue violence of all forms will end between the youth in these two

neighborhoods because of the longstanding nature of the rivalry. However, it is possible to redirect the violence to less lethal forms.

Another implication of this research is the need for positive male role models. This recommendation was made by several of the individuals I interviewed. The shift to using lethal forms of violence, such as guns, occurred when many of the older, more experienced associates of each gang were being imprisoned or killed. The remaining gang associates were left without older role models. Although it may seem absurd to suggest gang associates need older gang member role models, the data suggests this could have prevented the shift to more lethal forms of violence over petty acts of disrespect. As Jamal Thompson described, “The older guys, they’d tell you guns are more trouble than they’re worth, you don’t need that. But the young guys have no OGs to tell them that.” I am not suggesting individuals who are currently incarcerated for crimes affiliated with each gang should be released so they can serve as role models, but rather these data suggest there needs to be positive, strong, male role models for the youth associated with these gangs. These role models need to be people who are respected by the current gang associates, and who have earned that respect without using guns.

Another previously described intervention technique is to focus on preventing long-term deferred retaliation. The data suggest shooting retaliations between these two rival gangs are not reflexive, but instead several months apart. By implementing more long-term response interventions following a gang-related shooting in either neighborhood, we could further interrupt the cycle of violence and decrease the number of potentially lethal shootings.

In addition to the aforementioned suggestions, I also strongly recommend creating programs that bring youth from each neighborhood together. Every person I interviewed explained how current youth have no idea why they hate individuals from the opposing public housing development; they simply know they are supposed to hate them. By bringing youth from both neighborhoods together, particularly when they are young, a greater sense of community and friendship can be fostered. Project FREE (Franklin Residents' Efforts for Equality) is a program that has strived to build bridges between the two communities to help stop violence, drugs, and crime (Heart of the City 2010). Several of the youth workers and community members I spoke with credited decreases in youth violence to this program's collaborative efforts between the two neighborhoods. Funding for this community-based program should be increased to allow for the program to have a more notable role in deterring gang violence. One of the other youth workers I spoke with explained how a gang-affiliated teen in Franklin Field will not participate in shootings in Franklin Hill because he has several friends there and does not want to risk hurting one of them or one of their loved ones. He is a rare exception in these neighborhoods, and was fortunate to work in a program whose purpose was to bring youth from Franklin Hill and Franklin Field together. Although he is only one success story, the creation of more programs like this one could lead to less violence.

An example of a previously successful method of bringing youth together from rival gangs to bring about peace is a gang truce. During the mid-2000s, a truce was mediated between the Bromley-Heath and H-Block gangs, two violent rivals in Roxbury (Braga et al. 2008). The theories behind this truce were preventive methods of stopping gang violence were needed instead of reactionary responses after violence was

committed, and the individuals involved in these gang rivalries needed outside social resources to help peacefully mediate the conflict. Although the truce did not permanently stop the violence between the two rival gangs, shootings in these gangs' territories decreased by 53% during the truce (Braga et al. 2008). The circumstances surrounding the Bromley-Heath and H-Block gang rivalry are similar to the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field rivalry, with both rivalries being neighborhood-based, yielding numerous shootings, and lasting for many years. The Bromley-Heath and H-Block truce focused on community and law enforcement partnership, and I believe this is an essential component to the success of this mediation. With the recent reopening of the Franklin Field Teen Center and the establishment of a constant police presence in the community, now could be an ideal time for increased police-community partnerships to help mediate a truce between the youth in these two neighborhoods. By mediating a truce between these two gangs, there will be a significant decrease in the amount of shooting violence in the Franklin Field and Franklin Hill areas because they are the major gangs in that neighborhood.

There are obviously many other factors that influence and help sustain violence, particularly structural factors that were beyond the scope of this thesis. Those structural problems, such as low socioeconomic status and poor education, also deserve further research and solutions geared toward fixing them; however, my thesis has focused on the micro-level needs of these two communities. Future research should be conducted on a case study basis in other neighborhoods with gang violence because every violent gang rivalry is not the same, implying different solutions could more positively influence some communities than others. Further research also should try to develop strategies to reduce

gang violence given current structural problems because it is possible these larger structural problems may not change in the near future.

This study has shown there is a great need for further research in this area. By understanding the underlying causes of gang violence and how it has been sustained over time, we can better attempt to stop the violence. Gangs in and of themselves are not a problem, but the violence they frequently commit against rival associates and other innocent individuals is a significant problem that needs more work to solve. In addition to showing the importance of further research, this analysis has shown the need for better data, spanning longer periods of time with greater accuracy in recording. If we are able to analyze long-term trends in gang violence with specific gangs, we will be better informed to intervene and stop the gang violence because we know what is continuing it. I recommend long-term research efforts continue to examine any shifts in violence between these rival gangs. I also recommend focusing on the person-based data, which seems more accurate at describing specific gang rivalries than the geographical data because it describes the victim's and offender's gang affiliations, as well as the gang-related motivation for the shooting. However, police departments should try to include more specific motivations (i.e. more specific than "gang-related") for shootings so researchers can determine if interpersonal disputes and issues of nonviolent disrespect are actually the main cause of gang shootings, or whether there is a different motivation we need to focus on to stop this gang violence.

Research is also needed to focus on interviewing the current generation of gang associates. Researchers and members of the IRB need to work in closer partnership to help find a safe way to interview current gang associates. These individuals would be an

invaluable resource to researchers, but strict IRB guidelines prevented me from interviewing anyone recently affiliated with a gang. Although I understand the IRB's concerns for my own safety, I believe improved understanding of this research topic is needed to better inform the general public that all gang associates are not dangerous to everyone they encounter. Discussions with researchers who have conducted this type of research should be encouraged so the risks of the research can be realistically evaluated.

The last question I asked each of my interview participants was, "Do you think the violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field will end? What would cause it to end?" Unfortunately, many people believed that although the violence *could* end, they did not think it *would* end. I hope this research will be of service to the individuals living and working in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field by providing them with a better understanding of what has sustained this gang violence and recommendations for helping to stop it. I hope this research will encourage other individuals to become as positive as one youth worker I interviewed: "I believe [the violence] will stop, and I believe we can stop it in this city. I believe I can make a difference."

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Appendix A: Interview Information Sheets

Appendix A-1: Interview Information Sheet for Law Enforcement Personnel and Youth Workers

Interview Information Sheet for Law Enforcement Personnel and Youth Workers

Please consider this information carefully before deciding whether to participate in this research.

Purpose of the research: To understand what has caused the continued violent gang rivalry between youth in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

What you will do in this research: If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to participate in one interview. You will be asked several questions. Some of them will be about your experience interacting with youth in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. Others will be about the violent gang rivalry that exists between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, and your experience moderating this rivalry. With your permission, I will tape record the interviews so I don't have to make so many notes. You will not be asked to state your name on the recording. The interviews will occur in a private room in the Franklin Hill and Franklin Field Teen Center, a private office in the Phillips Brooks House Association, your office, or over the phone.

Time required: The interview will take approximately 1 hour.

Risks: No risks are anticipated.

Benefits: This is a chance for you to share your knowledge about the ongoing violent gang rivalry in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

Confidentiality: Your responses to interview questions will be kept confidential. At no time will your actual identity be revealed. You will be assigned a random numerical code. Anyone who helps me transcribe responses will only know you by this code. The recording will be erased when my thesis has been graded. The transcript, without your name, will be kept until the research is complete.

The key code linking your name with your number will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a locked office, and no one but me will have access to it. It will be destroyed when my thesis has been graded. The data you give me will be used for my senior thesis in sociology, and may be used as the basis for articles or presentations in the future. I won't use your name or information that would identify you in any publications or presentations. You will be referred to as a local law enforcement officer or a local youth worker, but identifying information beyond that will never be released.

Participation and withdrawal: Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You may withdraw by informing me that you no longer wish to participate (no questions will be asked). You may also skip any question during the interview, but continue to participate in the rest of the study.

Contact: If you have questions or concerns about this research, please contact: Danielle Schnur, Mailing Address: 441 Quincy Mail Center, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: dschnur@fas.harvard.edu You may also contact the faculty member supervising this work: Bruce Western, Professor of Sociology, Mailing Address: 33 Kirkland Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, 617-495-3879, Email: western@wjh.harvard.edu

Whom to contact about your rights in this research, for questions, concerns, suggestions, or complaints that are not being addressed by the researcher, or research-related harm: Jane Calhoun, Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research, 1414 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 234, Cambridge, MA 02138. Phone: 617-495-5459. E-mail: jcalhoun@fas.harvard.edu

Appendix A-2: Interview Information Sheet for Former Gang Associates

Interview Information Sheet for Former Gang Associates and Community Members

Please consider this information carefully before deciding whether to participate in this research.

Purpose of the research: To understand what has caused the continued violent gang rivalry between youth in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

What you will do in this research: If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to participate in one interview. You will be asked several questions. Some of them will be about your knowledge and involvement in a gang. Others will be about the gang rivalry that exists between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field. With your permission, I will tape record the interviews so I don't have to make so many notes. You will not be asked to state your name on the recording. The interviews will be in a private room in the Harvard Street Neighborhood Health Center, or if you prefer, in your office.

Time required: The interview will take approximately 1 hour.

Risks: No risks are anticipated. The only possible risk is a breach of confidentiality, but the Confidentiality section (see below) states how this risk will be minimized

Benefits: This is a chance for you to share your knowledge and tell your story about your experiences concerning the ongoing violent gang rivalry in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field.

Compensation: You will be paid \$15 for completing this interview and will be paid at the end of the interview.

Confidentiality: Your responses to interview questions will be kept confidential. At no time will your actual identity be revealed. You will be assigned a random numerical code. Anyone who helps me transcribe responses will only know you by this code. The recording will be erased when my thesis has been graded. The transcript, without your name, will be kept until the research is complete.

The key code linking your name with your number will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a locked office, and no one else will have access to it. It will be destroyed when my thesis has been graded. The data you give me will be used for my senior thesis in sociology, and may be used as the basis for articles or presentations in the future. I won't use your name or information that would identify you in any publications or presentations. You will be given a pseudonym (fake name) and be referred to as an individual who formerly resided in the neighborhood several decades ago.

Participation and withdrawal: Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You may withdraw by informing me that you no longer wish to participate (no questions will be asked). You may also skip any question during the interview, but continue to participate in the rest of the study.

Contact: If you have questions or concerns about this research, please contact: Danielle Schnur, Mailing Address: 441 Quincy Mail Center, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: dschnur@fas.harvard.edu You may also contact the faculty member supervising this work: Bruce Western, Professor of Sociology, Mailing Address: 33 Kirkland Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, 617-495-3879, Email: western@wjh.harvard.edu

Whom to contact about your rights in this research, for questions, concerns, suggestions, or complaints that are not being addressed by the researcher, or research-related harm: Jane Calhoun, Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research, 1414 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 234, Cambridge, MA 02138. Phone: 617-495-5459. E-mail: jcalhoun@fas.harvard.edu

Appendix B: Interview Guides

Appendix B-1: Interview Guide for Law Enforcement Personnel

1. What is your primary occupation in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field? How many years have you worked in FF/FH area?
2. Describe your work in FF/FH—what is a typical day like in your job? Where do you physically spend the majority of your time (Franklin Hill or Franklin Field)? With whom?
3. Do you ever feel unsafe in Franklin Hill? In Franklin Field?
4. How did you become a police officer?
5. What does the violence in Franklin look like now (or when you were last working there)? How, if at all, has this violence changed over time? What did violence in Franklin look like in the 1980s? 1990s? 2000s? *How did the violence begin?*
6. When did gangs emerge in FH (FHG)? In FF (FFB)?
7. How many people are in the Franklin Hill gang? What are their ages/races/genders? How many people are in the Franklin Field gang? What are their ages/races/genders?
8. Describe the relationship between these two gangs. Tell me about the history of the gang rivalry in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field—How did it start? How has it continued? How have the gangs changed over the years?
9. What role, if any, do drugs play in the gang rivalry? How often do you see drug crimes in Franklin Hill? Franklin Field? *Are there drug turf problems between the Hill and the Field? Has this changed over time?*
10. How often do you encounter youth who are involved in gang activities in Franklin Hill? In the Field? Has this changed since you first began your work?
11. Are your interactions with one gang different than your interactions with another?
12. Which gang (Franklin Hill or Franklin Field) is the most violent? Has this changed over time?
13. What, if anything, precedes violent actions between the rival gangs? (general—assaults, robbery, etc.)
14. What events occur before a physical assault or beating? What events occur before a non-lethal shooting? What events occur before a lethal shooting?

15. What are the reactions of each gang to a gang-related non-fatal shooting? What are the reactions of each gang to a gang-related homicide?
16. Are all of the gang members equally responsible for the violence that occurs in the community? If not, how many within the group are responsible for the majority of the violent crimes?
17. Have you noticed any differences in gang behavior when the most violent offenders are removed from the neighborhood (incarcerated, moved away, killed)?
18. Do you know of any "OGs"? (Original Gangsters) Do they still reside in the neighborhood? What is their role in the gang currently?
19. Do you remember the Kimberly Rae Harbour incident? What was your reaction to that incident? What do you remember happening in Franklin after that incident?
20. Do you ever think the violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field will end? What do you think it would take for it to end?
21. Is there anything else relevant to the violent gang rivalry in Franklin that I should know? Is there anything I haven't asked that you think I should?

Appendix B-2: Interview Guide for Youth Workers

1. What is your primary occupation in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field? How many years have you worked in FF/FH area?
2. Describe your work in FF/FH—what is a typical day like in your job? Where do you physically spend the majority of your time (Franklin Hill or Franklin Field)? With whom?
3. Do you ever feel unsafe in Franklin Hill? In Franklin Field?
4. How did you become a youth worker?
5. Have you ever been associated with a gang? (If yes, shift to Interview Guide for Former Gang Associates)
6. What did violence in Franklin look like in the 1980s? 1990s? 2000s? *How did the violence begin?* What does the violence in Franklin look like now (or when you were last working there)? How, if at all, has this violence changed over time?
7. When did gangs emerge in FH (FHG)? In FF (FFB)?
8. How many people are in the Franklin Hill gang? What are their ages/races/genders? How many people are in the Franklin Field gang? What are their ages/races/genders?
9. Describe the relationship between these two gangs. Tell me about the history of the gang rivalry in Franklin Hill and Franklin Field—How did it start? How has it continued? How have the gangs changed over the years?
10. What role, if any, do drugs play in the gang rivalry? How often do you see drug crimes in Franklin Hill? Franklin Field? Are there drug turf problems between the Hill and the Field? Has this changed over time?
11. How often do you encounter youth who are involved in gang activities in Franklin Hill? In the Field? Has this changed since you first began your work?
12. Are your interactions with one gang different than your interactions with another?
13. Which gang (Franklin Hill or Franklin Field) is the most violent? Has this changed over time?
14. What, if anything, precedes violent actions between the rival gangs? (general—assaults, robbery, etc.)
15. What events occur before a physical assault or beating? What events occur before a non-lethal shooting? What events occur before a lethal shooting?

16. What are the reactions of each gang to a gang-related non-fatal shooting? What are the reactions of each gang to a gang-related homicide?
17. Are all of the gang members equally responsible for the violence that occurs in the community? If not, how many within the group are responsible for the majority of the violent crimes?
18. Have you noticed any differences in gang behavior when the most violent offenders are removed from the neighborhood (incarcerated, moved away, killed)?
19. Do you know of any "OGs"? (Original Gangsters) Do they still reside in the neighborhood? What is their current role in the gang?
20. Do you remember the Kimberly Rae Harbour incident? What was your reaction to that incident? What do you remember happening in Franklin after that incident?
21. Do you ever think the violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field will end? What do you think it would take for it to end?
22. Is there anything else relevant to the violent gang rivalry in Franklin that I should know? Is there anything I haven't asked that you think I should?

Appendix B-3: Interview Guide for Former Gang Associates

1. Do you still live in (Franklin Hill/Franklin Field)? If not, where do you live now? When did you leave (Franklin Hill/Franklin Field)? Why did you move?
2. What was it like living in (Franklin Hill/Franklin Field) as a child? Teen?
3. Did you ever walk around (Franklin Hill/Franklin Field—opposite of where they reside)?
4. Did you ever feel unsafe in your neighborhood? In (Franklin Hill or Franklin Field—opposite of where they live)? Describe a time you felt unsafe (where were you, who were you with, when was it, what happened, etc.)
5. Were you ever associated with a gang? Was anyone you were close with associated with a gang? Which gang?
6. Describe how you became a member of the gang. (Did you feel forced into joining the gang)?
7. What was a typical day like in your gang?
8. How many people were in your gang? What were their ages/races/genders? How many people were related to each other? How were they related?
9. Describe your interactions with associates of other gangs. Which gangs did you interact with? How many people were in the other gang(s)? What were their ages/races/genders? What were these interactions like (alliances, violence, etc.)?
10. Describe the history of your gang. When did it start? How many people were first involved? How did it begin? What was the purpose of the gang?
11. Describe how the violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field began. What does the violence in Franklin look like now (or when you were last working there)? How, if at all, has this violence changed over time? What did violence in Franklin look like in the 1980s? 1990s? 2000s?
12. How often do you see drugs in Franklin Hill? Franklin Field? Describe any drug turf problems between the Hill and the Field. What role do drugs play in the gang rivalry between FHG and FFB? Has this changed over time (1980s, 1990s, 2000s)?
13. Which gang causes more problems for you? Which gang causes more problems for the community? Describe the problems. Which gang is more violent? How are they more violent?
14. What, if anything, happens before violence between FHG and FFB?

15. What happens before someone gets jumped or beat up (a physical beating, no guns)? What happens afterwards?
16. What happens before someone gets shot but not killed (capped—shot in the leg or somewhere not intending to kill them)? What happens afterwards?
17. What happens before someone is shot and killed (intentional homicide)? What happens afterwards?
18. How many people are actually involved in the violence from the Hill? From the Field? Does everyone commit the same amount of violence? How is it decided who commits the most/least?
19. Describe what happens to the gang after the most violent individuals disappear from the gang (locked up/incarcerated, killed, move away, etc.). Are there any differences in the amount of violence the gang commits? Are there differences in the amount of violence committed against the gang?
20. Do you remember the Kimberly Rae Harbour incident in the early 1990s? What was your reaction to that incident? What do you remember happening in Franklin after that incident?
21. Do you know what an “OG” (Original Gangster) or an “oldhead” is? How do you define an OG? An oldhead? Do you consider yourself an OG? An oldhead? Do you know of any (other) OGs? Where do they live (still in neighborhood)? What is their role in the gang currently?
22. Do you ever think the violence between Franklin Hill and Franklin Field will end? What do you think it would take for it to end?
23. Is there anything else relevant to the violent gang rivalry in Franklin I should know? Is there anything I haven’t asked that you think I should?

Appendix C: List of Interview Codes

1980s	Individual characteristics
1990s	Initiation
2000s	Interpersonal conflicts
Access to guns	Joining gang/reason to join gang
Age	Jumpings
Age differences in violence	Key players
Aggression	Kimberly Rae murder
Anecdotal shooting	Leaving the gang
Anniversaries	Levels of violence
Beef	Media Influence
Beginning of gang violence	Money
Bloods and Crips	Neighborhood background
Boston background	Non-fatal shooting-cause
Boston Miracle	Non-fatal shooting-reaction
Cause of gang violence	OGs
Collaboration of gangs	Old beef/historical disputes
Community-police relationship	On sight violence
Decrease in violence	Other
Disrespect	Other gangs
Drive-bys	Pack mentality
Drugs	Peer Pressure
DYS	Physical beating-cause
End to violence	Physical beating-reaction
Escalation	Prostitution
Escape	Race
Failure to remember names	Random brutal violence
Family tradition	Relationship to people in gang
Famous cases	Reputation
Fatal shooting-cause	Residents
Fatal shooting-reaction	Respect
FH Renovation	Retaliation
Field more violent	Rivalry in incarceration
Fighting skill	Role of law enforcement
Gang characteristics	Rumors
Gang history	Shooting skill
Gangs changing over time	Size of gang
Gender/Role of girls	Snitch
Geographical divide	Solution
Gilligan's shame theory	Structural problems
Hill more violent	Turf disputes
Historical nature of rivalry	Vandalism
Incarceration	Violence ending
Increase in violence	Violence Trends

Appendix D: Interview Subject Information

Pseudonym	Interview Population	Area of Residence/Employment
Andre Mills	CM/Former Gang Member	FF
Anthony Berry	CM/Former Gang Member	FH
Bryan Jacobs	CM/Former Gang Member	FH
Cameron Jackson	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Casey Donovan	Youth Worker	FH and FF
Charles Wells	Youth Worker	FH and FF
Darren Rosse	Youth Worker	FH and FF
Dave Lee	Youth Worker	FH and FF
Deshawna Walker	CM/Former Gang Member	FF
Dominic Reese	Youth Worker	FH and FF
Jamal Thompson	CM/Former Gang Member	FH
Jon Stall	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Julio Baconte	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Justin Mitchell	CM/Former Gang Member	FF
Le'Sean Williams	CM/Former Gang Member	FH
Mitch Penny	CM/Former Gang Member	FF
Nicholas Matthews	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Rob Taylor	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Ryan Jacobs	Law Enforcement	FH and FF
Sean Collins	Youth Worker	FH and FF

Note: CM = "Longtime Community Member"; FF = Franklin Field; FH = Franklin Hill